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It	  has	  been	  recently	  debated	  whether	  there	  exists	  a	  so-­‐called	  “easy	  road”	  to	  nominalism.	  In	  this	  
essay,	  I	  attempt	  to	  fill	  a	  lacuna	  in	  the	  debate	  by	  making	  a	  connection	  with	  the	  literature	  on	  
infinite	  and	  infinitesimal	  idealization	  in	  science	  through	  an	  example	  from	  mathematical	  physics	  
that	  has	  been	  largely	  ignored	  by	  philosophers.	  Specifically,	  by	  appealing	  to	  John	  Norton’s	  
distinction	  between	  idealization	  and	  approximation,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  phenomena	  of	  fractional	  
quantum	  statistics	  bears	  negatively	  on	  Mary	  Leng’s	  proposed	  path	  to	  easy	  road	  nominalism,	  
thereby	  partially	  defending	  Mark	  Colyvan’s	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  no	  easy	  road	  to	  nominalism.	  	  
	  
	   	  
1.	  Introduction	  
	  
The	  overarching	  goal	  of	  this	  essay	  is	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  some	  interesting	  connections	  between	  the	  
literature	  on	  infinite	  and	  infinitesimal	  idealizations	  in	  science	  and	  issues	  in	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics	  
such	  as	  mathematical	  indispensability	  and	  explanation.1	  Recently,	  several	  papers	  have	  discussed	  the	  
feasibility	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “easy	  road”	  to	  nominalism.2	  The	  question	  motivating	  (what	  I	  will	  call)	  the	  
easy	  road	  nominalism	  debate	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  reject	  platonism	  about	  mathematical	  
objects,	  while	  committing	  to	  some	  substantial	  form	  of	  scientific	  realism,	  but	  doing	  so	  without	  taking	  
the	  “hard	  road”	  to	  nominalism.	  The	  hard	  road	  includes	  purging	  our	  best	  scientific	  theories	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Looking	  ahead,	  I	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  overstate	  my	  case.	  Some	  connection	  have	  already	  been	  made,	  e.g.,	  Maddy	  
(1997),	  Leng	  (2010),	  Baron	  (2016),	  De	  Bianchi	  (2016).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  case	  study	  that	  I	  consider,	  the	  relevance	  of	  
Norton’s	  distinction	  between	  approximation	  and	  idealization,	  and	  the	  particular	  problems	  posed	  by	  
infinite/infinitesimal	  idealizations	  for	  issues	  in	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics	  have	  been	  largely	  ignored	  to	  my	  best	  
knowledge.	  
2	  E.g.,	  Colyvan	  (2010,	  2012),	  Azzouni	  (2012),	  Bueno	  (2012),	  Leng	  (2012),	  Liggins	  (2012),	  and	  Yablo	  (2012).	  Also	  see	  
even	  more	  recent	  essays	  in	  the	  special	  issue	  Molinini	  et	  al.	  (2016).	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quantifying	  over	  abstract	  mathematical	  objects.3	  Said	  differently,	  advocates	  of	  the	  hard	  road	  to	  
nominalism	  claim	  that	  mathematical	  objects	  are	  not	  indispensable	  to	  our	  best	  scientific	  theories,	  and	  
then	  continue	  to	  dispense	  with	  such	  objects.	  They	  then	  are	  not	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  Quine-­‐Putnam	  
indispensability	  argument,	  a	  main	  tenet	  of	  which	  is	  the	  Quinean	  ontic	  thesis	  that	  we	  are	  committed	  to	  
the	  existence	  of	  all	  the	  entities	  we	  indispensably	  quantify	  over	  in	  our	  best	  scientific	  theories.4	  The	  easy	  
road	  nominalists,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  accept	  the	  thesis	  that	  mathematical	  entities	  are	  indispensable	  to	  
our	  best	  scientific	  theories.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  claimed	  that	  indispensability	  does	  not	  warrant	  reification	  
(at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mathematical	  entities).	  
	   Various	  strategies	  have	  been	  explicated	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  easy	  road,5	  but	  Colyvan	  (2010)	  argues	  
that	  such	  approaches	  can	  only	  succeed	  if	  one	  rejects	  the	  idea	  there	  are	  genuine	  mathematical	  
explanations	  of	  empirical	  phenomena	  in	  science.	  However,	  many	  proponents	  of	  the	  debate	  agree	  that	  
this	  seems	  unlikely.6	  	  What	  I	  wish	  to	  do	  here	  is	  concentrate	  on	  easy	  road	  nominalism	  that	  embraces	  
scientific	  realism,	  accepts	  that	  there	  are	  mathematical	  explanations	  in	  science,	  and	  is	  thus	  moved	  by	  
what	  Alan	  Baker	  (2009,	  6130)	  has	  called	  the	  Enhanced	  Indispensability	  Argument	  (EIA):	  
	  
(1)	  We	  ought	  rationally	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  any	  entity	  that	  plays	  an	  indispensable	  
explanatory	  role	  in	  our	  best	  scientific	  theories.	  
(2)	  Mathematical	  objects	  play	  an	  indispensable	  explanatory	  role	  in	  science.	  
(3)	  Hence,	  we	  ought	  rationally	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  mathematical	  objects.	  7	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  Field	  (1980)	  for	  such	  an	  attempt.	  
4	  See	  Putnam	  (1971)	  and	  Quine	  (1981),	  and	  see	  Colyvan	  (2001)	  for	  an	  in-­‐depth	  study	  of	  the	  indispensability	  
argument	  and	  a	  defense.	  	  
5	  E.g.,	  Azzouni	  (2004),Balaguer	  (1998),	  Melia	  (2000,	  2002),	  and	  Yablo	  (1998,	  2002).	  
6	  Mainly	  because	  of	  numerous	  examples	  that	  do	  seem	  to	  provide	  genuine	  mathematical	  explanation,	  e.g.,	  Baker	  
(2005,	  2009,	  2012),	  Colyvan	  (2001,	  2007,	  2010).	  Moreover,	  the	  example	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper	  purports	  to	  be	  
such	  a	  genuine	  mathematical	  explanation.	  
7	  Many	  are	  unconvinced	  by	  the	  EIA	  and	  I	  would	  like	  to	  say	  a	  bit	  about	  why	  some	  may	  feel	  the	  argument	  is	  
compelling.	  Science	  is	  in	  the	  business	  of	  giving	  scientific	  explanations,	  but	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  something	  can	  be	  
explanatory	  but	  not	  exist.	  For	  example,	  on	  a	  causal-­‐mechanistic	  account	  of	  explanation	  (e.g.,	  Salmon	  1984),	  it	  
would	  seem	  absurd	  if	  one	  were	  told	  that	  a	  particular	  gene	  mutation	  explains	  some	  disease	  but	  that	  the	  same	  gene	  
doesn’t	  exist.	  Similarly,	  on	  a	  covering	  law	  account	  of	  explanation	  (Hempel	  and	  Oppenheim	  1948)	  it	  seems	  
unreasonable	  to	  explain	  the	  motion	  of	  planets	  given	  Newton’s	  universal	  law	  of	  gravitation	  but	  then	  claim	  that	  
there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  the	  universal	  law	  of	  gravitation.	  In	  the	  same	  manner,	  Platonists	  like	  Colyvan	  (2001,	  2007,	  
2010)	  and	  Baker	  (2005,	  2009,	  2012)	  think	  that	  there	  is	  something	  seriously	  wrong	  with	  denying	  the	  existence	  of,	  
say,	  prime	  numbers,	  but	  then	  arguing	  that	  the	  primeness	  of	  thirteen	  and	  seventeen	  (along	  with	  a	  number	  of	  
evolutionary	  hypothesis)	  explains	  why	  the	  North	  American	  periodical	  magicicada	  cicadas	  only	  appear	  every	  
thirteen	  or	  seventeen	  years.	  Of	  course,	  there	  are	  others	  who	  think	  that	  fiction	  can	  be	  explanatory,	  e.g.	  Bokulich	  
(2008).	  In	  any	  case,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  assume	  that	  the	  EIA	  is	  convincing	  enough	  to	  take	  seriously	  




Such	  an	  approach	  is	  put	  forth	  by	  Mary	  Leng	  (2005,	  2010,	  2012).	  In	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  a	  
particular	  example	  from	  mathematical	  physics,	  so-­‐called	  “fractional	  quantum	  statistics”	  manifested	  by	  
“anyons”	  in	  “fractional	  quantum	  Hall	  effect”	  systems,	  bears	  negatively	  on	  Leng’s	  proposal	  for	  easy	  road	  
nominalism,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  I	  partially	  defend	  Mark	  Colyvan’s	  (2010,	  2012a,	  2012b)	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  
no	  easy	  road	  to	  nominalism.8	  What	  is	  interesting	  about	  the	  anyon	  case	  study	  is	  that	  it	  appeals	  to	  a	  kind	  
of	  infinitesimal	  idealization—a	  two-­‐dimensional	  model	  of	  quantum	  mechanics—that	  in	  turn	  seems	  to	  
play	  an	  essential	  role	  in	  the	  scientific	  account	  of	  anyons.	  This	  is	  similar	  to	  other	  infinite	  idealizations,	  
such	  as	  thermodynamic-­‐type	  limits	  for	  phase	  transitions	  and	  spontaneous	  symmetry	  breaking	  
(Batterman	  2002,	  2005;	  Ruetsche	  2011;	  Shech	  2013),	  and	  infinitesimal	  idealizations,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  quantum-­‐classical	  limit	  (Batterman	  2002,	  Bokulich	  2008),	  which	  purportedly	  play	  an	  
indispensible	  explanatory	  role.9	  Thus,	  in	  fleshing	  out	  the	  consequences	  of	  fractional	  quantum	  statistics	  
for	  Leng’s	  approach	  to	  easy	  road	  nominalism,	  I	  am	  attempting	  to	  fill	  a	  lacuna	  in	  the	  easy	  road	  
nominalism	  debate.10	  My	  suggestion	  then	  is	  that	  further	  insight	  into	  the	  plausibility	  of	  easy	  road	  
nominalism	  may	  be	  gained	  by	  studying	  closely	  examples	  from	  science	  wherein	  ostensibly	  essential,	  
infinite/infinitesimal	  idealizations	  arise.	  
	   In	  what	  follows,	  I	  first	  introduce	  Leng’s	  (2005,	  2010,	  2012)	  approach	  to	  easy	  road	  nominalism	  in	  
Section	  2	  and	  show	  how	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  physical	  system	  can	  “approximately	  instantiate”	  
mathematical	  structure	  where	  a	  mathematical	  explanation	  is	  at	  hand.	  	  Since	  Leng	  (2005,	  2010,	  2012)	  
does	  not	  does	  explicate	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  “approximate	  instantiation,”	  I	  critically	  consider	  a	  possible	  
way	  of	  expounding	  on	  her	  account	  via	  John	  Norton’s	  (2012)	  well-­‐received	  distinction	  between	  
approximations	  and	  idealizations	  in	  Section	  3:	  physical	  structure	  can	  approximately	  instantiate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
8	  In	  hope	  to	  thwart	  an	  objection	  early,	  note	  that	  I’m	  only	  partially	  defending	  Colyvan	  (2010)	  since	  there	  are	  other	  
approaches	  to	  easy	  road	  nominalism,	  e.g.,	  Azzouni	  (2012),	  Bueno	  (2012),	  Liggins	  (2012),	  and	  Yablo	  (2012),	  which	  
purport	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  mathematical	  explanation.	  Also	  recall	  that	  the	  overarching	  goal	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  make	  
interesting	  connections	  between	  infinite	  and	  infinitesimal	  idealization	  in	  science	  and	  the	  easy	  road	  nominalism	  
debate—it	  is	  not	  to	  mount	  a	  comprehensive	  defense	  of	  Colyvan’s	  (2010)	  thesis.	  
9	  There	  may	  be	  an	  interesting	  difference	  between	  infinite	  and	  infinitesimal	  idealizations	  but	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  
paper	  I’m	  assuming	  that	  both	  idealizations	  are	  on	  equal	  footing,	  so	  to	  speak.	  Note	  that,	  insofar	  as	  an	  idealization	  
enters	  physical	  theory	  via	  a	  limiting	  procedure,	  an	  infinite	  idealization	  is	  just	  the	  inverse	  of	  an	  infinitesimal	  
idealization	  and	  vice	  versa.	  
10	  Very	  recently,	  the	  role	  of	  idealizations	  in	  the	  debate	  have	  been	  considered	  by	  Baron	  (2016)	  and	  De	  Bianchi	  
(2016),	  which	  I	  discuss	  briefly	  in	  Section	  5,	  but	  the	  emphasize	  in	  not	  placed	  on	  the	  distinctly	  indispensable	  role	  of	  
infinite/infinitesimal	  idealization	  in	  science.	  Similarly,	  discussion	  of	  idealization	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics,	  
e.g.,	  Maddy	  (1997),	  Leng	  (2010;	  116-­‐122,	  133-­‐137),	  either	  does	  not	  explicitly	  discuss	  the	  type	  of	  essential,	  
infinite/infinitesimal	  idealizations	  that	  I’m	  concerned	  with;	  or	  else	  it	  is	  assumed	  or	  concluded	  that	  such	  issues	  do	  
not	  introduce	  substantive	  novel	  problems	  for	  the	  nominalist.	  I	  will	  argue	  otherwise.	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mathematical	  structure	  if	  the	  latter	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  an	  approximation	  (in	  Norton’s	  sense)	  of	  the	  
former.	  Next,	  I	  present	  the	  case	  study	  of	  the	  anyons	  and	  fractional	  statistics	  along	  with	  the	  standard	  
explanatory	  story	  found	  in	  the	  physics	  literature	  in	  Section	  4	  as	  an	  example	  of	  an	  indispensable	  
mathematical	  explanation	  wherein	  there	  is	  no	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  mathematical	  structure	  appealed	  to	  
in	  order	  to	  explain	  fractional	  statistics	  is	  “approximately	  instantiated”	  in	  a	  physical	  system.	  Section	  5	  
explains	  that	  cases	  such	  as	  fractional	  statistics	  are	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  our	  best	  physical	  theories	  and	  
entertains	  three	  nominalist	  objections.	  My	  hope	  is	  that	  it	  will	  be	  clear	  from	  my	  discussion	  of	  fractional	  
statistics	  and	  essential,	  infinite/infinitesimal	  idealizations	  that	  the	  study	  of	  such	  examples	  may	  greatly	  
inform	  the	  debate	  on	  easy	  road	  nominalism	  and,	  more	  generally,	  the	  cogency	  of	  mathematical	  
explanations.	  I	  conclude	  the	  paper	  with	  a	  short	  summary	  in	  Section	  6	  (and	  have	  added	  an	  appendix	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  paper	  with	  technical	  details).	  
	  
	  
2.	  Leng’s	  Easy	  Road	  Nominalism	  
	  
Mary	  Leng’s	  (2005,	  2010,	  2012)	  approach	  to	  easy	  road	  nominalism	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  defense	  of	  
nominalistic	  scientific	  realism	  (NSR),	  which	  may	  be	  characterized	  as	  follows:	  
	  
The	  view	  that	  the	  nominalistic	  content	  of	  empirical	  science―that	  is,	  what	  empirical	  science	  
entails	  about	  the	  physical	  world―is	  true	  (or	  mostly	  true…),	  while	  its	  platonistic	  content―that	  is,	  
what	  it	  entails	  “about”	  an	  abstract	  mathematical	  realm―is	  fictional.	  (Balagaur	  1998,	  131)	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  rough	  consensus	  that	  the	  plausibility	  of	  NSR	  depends	  on	  either	  excising	  mathematical	  
explanations	  from	  science,	  or	  else	  illustrating	  “how	  mathematics	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  function	  
successfully	  in	  explanatory	  contexts	  even	  if	  mathematical	  objects	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  mere	  fictions”	  (Leng	  
2012,	  986).	  The	  later	  route,	  taken	  by	  Leng	  (2005,	  2010,	  2012),	  involves	  showing	  that	  mathematical	  
structure	  plays	  a	  representational	  role	  (in	  the	  mathematical	  explanation	  of	  a	  physical	  phenomenon)	  
such	  that	  “…our	  explanations	  work	  by	  displaying	  the	  phenomenon	  as	  being	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  
(approximate)	  instantiation	  of	  that	  structure	  in	  the	  empirical	  situation	  at	  hand”	  (Leng	  2012,	  990-­‐991).	  
	   In	  other	  words,	  we	  can	  avoid	  platonism	  but	  remain	  scientific	  realists	  (of	  the	  NSR	  bent)	  by	  
showing	  how	  an	  explanation	  of	  physical	  phenomenon	  is	  given	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
phenomenon	  follows	  from	  a	  mathematical	  structure	  that	  is	  approximately	  instantiated	  in	  a	  physical	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system.	  These	  types	  of	  explanations,	  called	  structural	  explanations	  by	  Leng,	  are	  fundamentally	  
mathematical	  explanations.11	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  physical	  system	  approximately	  instantiates	  
the	  mathematical	  structure	  allows	  us	  to	  gain	  a	  genuine	  mathematical	  explanation	  without	  reification.	  
	   	  
A	  structural	  explanation	  will	  explain	  a	  phenomenon	  by	  showing	  (a)	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  occurs	  
in	  a	  physical	  system	  instantiating	  a	  general	  mathematical	  structure,	  and	  (b)	  the	  existence	  of	  that	  
phenomenon	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  structure	  characterizing	  axioms	  once	  suitably	  interpreted.	  
(Leng	  2012,	  989)	  
	  
As	  an	  example,	  Leng	  (2012,	  989-­‐990)	  considers	  the	  explanation	  of	  why	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  
construct	  a	  square	  with	  the	  same	  area	  of	  a	  circle	  (with	  only	  a	  compass	  and	  ruler).	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  𝜋	  
(and	  thus	   𝜋)	  is	  a	  transcendental	  number.12	  The	  explanation	  consists	  of	  two	  parts.	  First,	  (a)	  physical	  
space	  approximately	  instantiates	  the	  structure	  of	  Euclidean	  space	  (and	  distance	  between	  points	  in	  
Euclidean	  space	  approximately	  instantiates	  the	  real	  numbers	  structure).	  Second	  (b),	  once	  we	  define	  
notions	  like	  rule/compass	  constructions	  and	  constructible	  points,	  we	  can	  show	  that	  it	  follows	  from	  the	  
axioms	  of	  Euclidean	  geometry	  that	  we	  cannot	  construct	  transcendental	  (real)	  numbers.	  
	  
Thus,	  the	  ultimate	  applicability	  of	  this	  explanation	  comes,	  not	  from	  the	  existence	  as	  abstract	  of	  
any	  of	  the	  mathematical	  objects	  involved,	  but	  rather,	  from	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  geometrical	  
axioms	  as	  (approximately)	  true	  about	  the	  physical	  space	  of	  paper	  and	  pencil	  drawings…	  [T]he	  
explanation	  is	  explanatory	  because	  it	  shows	  an	  empirical	  phenomenon	  (our	  inability	  to	  find	  
certain	  ruler/compass	  constructions)	  to	  result	  from	  the	  general	  structural	  features	  of	  the	  
situation.	  It	  enables	  us	  to	  see	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  impossibility	  of	  circle	  squaring	  and	  other	  
impossible	  constructions,	  and	  it	  enables	  us	  to	  see	  the	  phenomenon	  as	  resulting	  from	  a	  necessity	  
not	  just	  from	  bad	  luck	  or	  poor	  construction.	  (Leng	  2012,	  990	  )	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  In	  calling	  such	  explanations	  structural	  explanation	  Leng	  is	  following	  some	  previous	  authors,	  e.g.,	  Railton	  (1980),	  
Hughes	  (1989),	  Bokulich	  (2008).	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  Bokulich	  (2008,	  149):	  
	  
	  [A]	  structural	  explanation	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  explanandum	  is	  explained	  by	  showing	  how	  the	  (typically	  
mathematical)	  structure	  of	  the	  theory	  itself	  limits	  what	  sorts	  of	  objects,	  properties,	  states,	  or	  behaviors	  
are	  admissible	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  that	  theory,	  and	  then	  showing	  that	  the	  explanandum	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  
consequence	  of	  that	  structure.	  
12	  A	  transcendental	  number	  is	  a	  number	  that	  is	  not	  a	  root	  of	  a	  (non-­‐trivial)	  polynomial	  with	  rational	  coefficients	  
(where	  a	  rational	  number	  is	  any	  number	  that	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  a	  fraction	  of	  two	  integers).	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Leng’s	  account,	  although	  intuitive	  and	  attractive,	  suffers	  from	  the	  weakness	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  
“approximate	  instantiation”	  is	  vague	  and	  not	  well	  defined.	  Accordingly,	  in	  the	  following	  section	  I	  will	  
attempt	  to	  remedy	  the	  situation	  by	  appealing	  to	  John	  Norton’s	  (2012)	  well-­‐received	  distinction	  between	  
“approximation”	  and	  “idealization.”13	  
	  
3.	  Approximation,	  Idealization,	  and	  Approximate	  Instantiation	  
	  
John	  Norton	  (2012,	  209)	  characterizes	  the	  difference	  between	  “approximation”	  and	  “idealization”	  as	  
follows:14	  
	  
An	  approximation	  is	  an	  inexact	  [representation]	  of	  a	  target	  system.	  […]	  
An	  idealization	  is	  a	  real	  or	  fictitious	  system,	  distinct	  from	  the	  target	  system,	  some	  of	  whose	  
properties	  provide	  inexact	  [representations]	  of	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  target	  system.	  
	  
More	  specifically,	  we	  can	  think	  of	  approximations	  and	  idealizations	  entering	  physical	  theory	  
through	  limiting	  procedures	  in	  which	  we	  consider	  sequences	  of	  systems	  (or	  models).	  The	  general	  
scheme	  that	  is	  implemented	  is	  as	  follows	  (212):	  
	  
System1,	  System2,	  System3,	  .	  .	  .	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  →	   Limit	  System	  
	  
And	  the	  corresponding	  sequence	  of	  properties	  is:	  
	  
Property1,	  Property2,	  Property3,	  .	  .	  .	  →	   Limit	  Property	  
	  
A	  limit	  property	  is	  an	  approximation	  (of,	  say,	  System1’s	  property	  Property1)	  in	  Norton’s	  sense	  
and	  it	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  property	  of	  a	  system	  and	  its	  limit,	  i.e.,	  a	  limit	  of	  the	  properties	  of	  a	  sequence	  of	  
systems.	  No	  novel	  reference	  is	  made	  to	  a	  real	  or	  fictitious	  system.	  Rather,	  the	  target	  system	  is	  referred	  
to	  directly	  and	  represented	  inexactly.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  limit	  system	  is	  an	  idealization	  in	  Norton’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper	  I	  set	  aside	  the	  objection	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  “physical	  structure”	  (and	  
thus	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  physical	  system	  instantiating	  any	  kind	  of	  mathematical	  structure)	  since	  “structure”	  is,	  
strictly	  speaking,	  a	  set-­‐theoretic	  notion	  (Frigg	  2006).	  
14	  For	  well-­‐received	  characterizations	  and	  taxonomies	  of	  idealizations	  see	  McMullin	  (1985)	  and	  Weisberg	  (2013).	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sense,	  and	  it	  concerns	  a	  system	  and	  its	  limit,	  i.e.,	  a	  limit	  of	  a	  sequence	  of	  systems.15	  Sometimes	  the	  limit	  
property	  (i.e.,	  a	  Nortonian	  approximation)	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  corresponding	  property	  of	  the	  limit	  system	  
(i.e.,	  the	  property	  of	  the	  Nortonian	  idealization).	  If,	  in	  turn,	  said	  limit	  system	  is	  used	  to	  represent	  some	  
physical	  target	  system,	  then	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  the	  property	  of	  the	  limit	  system	  is	  approximately	  
instantiated	  in	  the	  target	  system.	  However,	  sometimes	  a	  limit	  property	  is	  not	  equal	  to	  the	  property	  of	  
the	  limit	  system	  and	  in	  such	  context	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  the	  property	  of	  the	  limit	  system	  is	  
approximately	  instantiated	  in	  the	  target	  system.	  Thus,	  in	  brief,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  a	  physical	  structure	  
approximately	  instantiates	  mathematical	  structure	  when	  the	  mathematical	  structure	  is	  an	  
approximation	  (in	  Norton’s	  sense)	  of	  the	  physical	  structure.	  
In	  a	  bit	  more	  detail,	  but	  still	  schematically,	  my	  proposal	  to	  expound	  on	  Leng’s	  account	  using	  
Norton’s	  distinctions	  is	  as	  follows.	  Let	  some	  real	  physical	  system	  be	  faithfully	  and	  accurately	  represented	  
by	  (some	  abstract-­‐mathematical	  system)	  𝑆!,	  where	  𝑆! 	  has	  a	  structure	  characterized	  by	  a	  set	  of	  
properties	  {𝑃!!}.16	  Let	  some	  abstract	  and	  idealized	  limit	  system	  𝑆!,	  with	  a	  mathematical	  structure	  
characterized	  by	  a	  set	  of	  properties	  {𝑃!!},	  represent	  or	  model	  𝑆! 	  in	  some	  explanatory	  context.	  	  The	  
notion	  of	  approximate	  instantiation	  can	  be	  fleshed	  out	  in	  the	  following	  manner:	  A	  physical	  system	  𝑆! 	  
approximately	  instantiates	  a	  general	  mathematical	  structure	  {𝑃!!}	  just	  in	  case	  the	  limit	  property,	  
symbolized	  by	  lim!→! 𝑃!!,	  equals	  the	  corresponding	  property	  of	  the	  idealized	  limit	  system	  𝑆!,	  viz.,	  𝑃!! = lim!→! 𝑃!!,	  for	  every	  property	  𝑖	  in	  the	  set	  characterizing	  the	  structure	  {𝑃!!}	  to	  be	  instantiated.	  
Alternatively,	  we	  could	  concentrate	  specifically	  on	  properties	  and	  say	  that	  a	  physical	  system	  𝑆! 	  
instantiates	  a	  mathematical	  property	  𝑃!!	  when	  𝑃!! = lim!→! 𝑃!! 	  (i.e.,	  when	  the	  property	  𝑃!!	  of	  the	  limit	  
system	  𝑆!	  matches	  the	  corresponding	  limit	  property	  𝑃!!).	  I	  am	  thus	  suggesting	  a	  kind	  of	  condition	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Butterfield	  (2011,	  Section	  3)	  discusses	  similar	  distinctions.	  In	  particular,	  he	  makes	  a	  distinction	  between	  a	  system	  𝜎(𝑁)	  that	  depends	  on	  some	  parameter	  𝑁	  (let	  {𝜎(𝑁)}	  denote	  a	  sequence	  of	  such	  systems),	  a	  quantity	  defined	  on	  
the	  system	  𝑓(𝜎 𝑁 )	  (let	  {𝑓(𝜎 𝑁 )}	  denote	  a	  sequence	  of	  quantities	  on	  successive	  systems),	  and	  a	  (real	  number)	  
value	  𝑣(𝑓 𝜎 𝑁 )	  of	  quantities	  on	  successive	  systems	  (where	  a	  sequence	  of	  states	  on	  𝜎(𝑁)	  is	  implicitly	  
understood;	  let	  {𝑣(𝑓 𝜎 𝑁 )}	  denote	  a	  sequence	  of	  values	  on	  successive	  systems).	  A	  limit	  system  𝜎(∞)	  arises	  
when	  lim!→!{𝜎(𝑁)}	  is	  well-­‐defined―otherwise	  there	  is	  no	  limit	  system.	  A	  property	  of	  a	  limit	  system	  refers	  to	  the	  
value	  𝑣(𝑓 𝜎 ∞ 	  of	  the	  (natural)	  limit	  quantity  𝑓 𝜎 ∞ 	  (in	  the	  natural	  limit	  state)	  on	  𝜎(∞).	  A	  limit	  property	  𝑣(𝑓 𝜎 𝑁 	  is	  a	  limit	  of	  a	  sequence	  of	  values	  of	  quantities	  on	  successive	  systems	  (or,	  values	  on	  the	  systems	  on	  the	  
way	  to	  the	  limit)	  and	  is	  well-­‐defined	  when	  lim!→!{𝑣(𝑓 𝜎 𝑁 )}	  exists.	  The	  question	  that	  I	  am	  discussing	  is	  
whether	  a	  property	  of	  a	  limit	  system	  equals	  the	  system’s	  limit	  property	  since	  this	  is	  what	  it	  precisely	  means	  for	  a	  
property	  to	  be	  approximately	  instantiated.	  Specifically,	  the	  question	  asks	  
whether  𝑣(𝑓(𝜎(∞)) = lim!→!{𝑣(𝑓 𝜎 𝑁 )}	  (assuming	  both	  are	  well-­‐defined).	  
16	  Strictly	  speaking,	  a	  structure	  𝑆 =< 𝑈,𝑂,𝑅,>	  is	  a	  composite	  entity	  consisting	  of	  a	  non	  empty	  set	  𝑈	  of	  individuals	  
called	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  structure	  𝑆,	  an	  indexed	  set	  𝑂	  of	  operations	  of	  𝑈,	  and	  a	  non-­‐empty	  indexed	  set	  𝑅	  of	  
relation	  on	  𝑈,	  where	  we	  can	  think	  of	  properties	  as	  one-­‐placed	  relations.	  For	  my	  purposes	  discussing	  structure	  as	  a	  
set	  of	  properties	  will	  do.	  In	  principle,	  one	  can	  extend	  my	  claims	  to	  the	  more	  formal	  characterization	  of	  structure.	  
8	  
	  
adequacy	  on	  any	  Leng-­‐type	  NSR	  account	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  appearing	  in	  some	  physical	  target	  system,	  
which	  appeals	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  “approximate	  instantiation:”	  
	  
Condition	  of	  Adequacy:	  Approximate	  instantiation	  can	  adequately	  justify	  an	  NRS	  account	  of	  a	  
phenomenon	  appearing	  in	  a	  physical	  target	  system	  just	  in	  case	  there	  is	  a	  match	  between	  the	  
relevant	  properties	  of	  the	  limit	  system	  (using	  to	  represent/model	  the	  target	  system)	  and	  the	  
corresponding	  limit	  properties.	  17	  
	  
The	  problem	  for	  Leng’s	  proposed	  easy	  road	  nominalism	  arises	  when	  we	  have	  a	  mathematical	  
explanation	  appealing	  to	  a	  structure	  that	  cannot	  be	  approximately	  instantiated	  in	  the	  physical	  situation	  
at	  hand	  so	  that	  the	  above	  stated	  condition	  of	  adequacy	  is	  not	  satisfied,	  i.e.,	  there	  is	  a	  mismatch	  between	  
some	  (used	  for	  explanatory	  purposes)	  property	  of	  a	  limit	  system	  and	  its	  corresponding	  limit	  property.	  In	  
the	  following	  section	  I	  will	  present	  an	  example	  that	  I	  submit	  is	  a	  genuine	  mathematical	  explanation,	  but	  
where	  there	  is	  no	  precise	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  mathematical	  structure	  is	  approximately	  instantiated	  in	  the	  
physical	  world.	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  section	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  further	  elucidate	  said	  claims	  with	  a	  toy-­‐
example.	  Readers	  familiar	  with	  Norton’s	  (2012)	  distinction	  (or	  Butterfield’s	  (2011)	  analogous	  distinction)	  
are	  encouraged	  to	  skip	  ahead	  to	  the	  next	  section.	  
Envisage	  some	  physical	  system	  with	  physical	  structure	  faithfully	  represented	  by	  a	  three-­‐
dimensional	  cube	  with	  sides	  of	  length	  𝐿	  and	  with	  some	  impenetrable	  point-­‐like	  object	  in	  its	  interior,	  
known	  as	  a	  “hole”	  (see	  Fig.	  1).	  We’ll	  be	  interested	  in	  two	  properties	  concerning	  this	  system.	  First,	  
whether	  or	  not	  loops	  inside	  the	  cubical	  space	  can	  be	  continuously	  deformed	  into	  a	  point.	  If	  this	  is	  
possible	  we’ll	  say	  that	  (the	  topology	  of)	  the	  space	  is	  simply	  connected	  and	  that	  it	  has	  a	  trivial	  
fundamental	  group	  (see	  Fig.	  2).	  If	  not,	  we’ll	  say	  the	  space	  is	  non-­‐simply	  connected	  (or	  multiply	  
connected)	  and	  that	  it	  has	  a	  non-­‐trivial	  fundamental	  group	  (see	  Fig.	  3).18	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  One	  may	  worry	  that	  the	  characterization	  for	  “approximate	  instantiation”	  suggested	  here	  seems	  to	  privilege	  
“continuous”	  properties	  over	  “discrete”	  properties.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case.	  We	  can	  reasonably	  talk	  
about	  a	  discrete	  series	  converging	  to	  a	  number,	  e.g.,	  1, !! , !! , !! ,…   → 0,	  or	  even	  a	  sequence	  of	  non-­‐continuous	  
functions	  converging	  to	  a	  function,	  e.g.,	  take	  𝑓 𝑥 = 0  𝑖𝑓  𝑥 ≠ 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑓 𝑥 = !!   𝑖𝑓  𝑥 = 0.	  Foreshadowing	  what	  is	  to	  
come,	  the	  problem	  with	  topological	  properties	  like	  “connectedness”	  is	  that,	  first,	  there	  is	  no	  convergence	  and,	  
second,	  notions	  like	  convergences,	  limits,	  continuity,	  etc.,	  all	  presuppose	  topological	  properties.	  
18	  These	  are	  all	  rough	  and	  intuitive	  characterizations	  of	  the	  notions	  of	  connectedness,	  homotopy,	  etc.	  They	  will	  do	  
for	  my	  purposes,	  and	  I	  will	  only	  introduce	  further	  details	  when	  necessary.	  For	  precise	  characterization	  see	  
standard	  textbooks	  on	  algebraic	  topology,	  e.g.	  Hatcher	  (2002).	  
9	  
	  
Second,	  we’ll	  want	  to	  ascertain	  what	  is	  the	  (three-­‐dimensional	  notion	  of	  a)	  volume	  𝑉	  of	  the	  
cubical	  system.	  Clearly,	  our	  cubical	  system	  has	  a	  volume	  equal	  to	  𝐿!	  and	  (as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  Fig.	  4)	  its	  
space	  is	  simply	  connected	  (i.e.,	  it	  has	  a	  trivial	  fundamental	  group)	  since	  all	  loops―even	  those	  that	  lie	  in	  
the	  plane	  with	  the	  impenetrable	  hole―can	  be	  continuously	  deformed	  and	  shrunk	  to	  a	  point.	  
	  





Fig.	  2	  The	  surface	  of	  a	  sphere	  as	  a	  simply	  connected	  space	  with	  a	  trivial	  fundamental	  group.	  
	  
	  
Next,	  consider	  a	  sequence	  of	  such	  systems	  in	  which	  the	  height	  of	  the	  cuboids,	  denoted	  by  𝑙,	  
shrinks	  (see	  Fig.	  5).	  	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  we’ll	  consider	  the	  sequence	  in	  the	  limit	  in	  which  𝑙 → 0	  (i.e.,	  an	  
infinitesimal	  idealization-­‐approximation).	  So	  long	  as	  we	  are	  on	  the	  way	  to	  the	  limit	  system,	  each	  system	  
in	  our	  sequence	  will	  have	  volume	  equal	  to	  𝐿!𝑙	  and	  trivial	  fundamental	  group.	  However,	  at	  the	  limit	  our	  
limit	  system	  will	  be	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  square	  with	  a	  zero	  volume	  and	  non-­‐trivial	  fundamental	  group	  
(see	  Fig.	  6).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  loops	  surrounding	  the	  hole	  cannot	  be	  continuously	  deformed	  to	  a	  point	  






Fig.	  3	  Non-­‐simply	  connected	  space	  with	  a	  non-­‐trivial	  fundamental	  group	  in	  which	  some	  loops	  cannot	  be	  
continuously	  shrunk	  to	  a	  point	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  impenetrable	  torus	  (left)	  and	  an	  impenetrable	  
infinite	  cylinder	  (right).	  
	  
Fig.	  4	  (Left)	  A	  simply	  connected	  space	  with	  a	  trivial	  fundamental	  group	  in	  which	  loops	  can	  be	  




Fig.	  5	  A	  sequence	  of	  systems	  of	  cuboids	  as	  the	  height	  shrinks.	  
	  
	  
 Fig.	  6	  On	  the	  way	  to	  the	  limit,	  each	  system	  in	  the	  sequence	  of	  cuboids	  is	  simply	  connected	  with	  trivial	  
fundamental	  group,	  and	  has	  a	  non-­‐zero	  volume.	  At	  the	  limit,	  the	  system	  is	  multiply	  connected	  with	  a	  
non-­‐trivial	  fundamental	  group,	  and	  with	  a	  zero	  volume.	  
	  
	  
Fig.	  7	  At	  the	  limit,	  the	  system	  is	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  square	  and	  so	  the	  space	  is	  multiply	  connected	  with	  a	  
non-­‐trivial	  fundamental	  group	  because	  loops	  surrounding	  the	  hole	  cannot	  be	  shrunk	  to	  a	  point.	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   Concentrating	  on	  the	  volume	  of	  our	  system	  we	  see	  that	  the	  limit	  property	  𝑉 = 𝐿!𝑙	  corresponds	  
to	  the	  property	  of	  the	  limit	  system	  𝑉 = 0	  when	  we	  take	  the	  limit.	  Said	  differently,	  if	  we	  ‘de-­‐idealized’	  
away	  by	  a	  small	  epsilon	  𝜀	  amount	  from	  the	  limit	  system	  so	  that	  the	  height  𝑙 = 𝜀,	  then	  the	  volume	  will	  be	  𝑉 = 𝐿!𝜀	  and	  this	  is	  approximately	  equal	  to	  zero.19	  Accordingly,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  a	  real	  physical	  system	  
approximately	  instantiates	  the	  structure	  of	  our	  idealized	  limit	  system	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  property	  of	  
volume	  since	  there	  exist	  a	  correspondence	  between	  the	  limit	  property	  (the	  approximation)	  and	  the	  
property	  of	  the	  limit	  system	  (the	  idealization)—our	  condition	  of	  adequacy	  is	  satisfied.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  
the	  height	  of	  our	  cube	  is	  very	  small,	  its	  volume	  will	  be	  approximately	  zero	  and	  Leng’s	  (2010,	  2012)	  talk	  
of	  “approximately	  instantiated”	  structure	  makes	  sense.	  
	   In	  stark	  contrast,	  when	  we	  focus	  upon	  the	  topology	  of	  the	  space	  we	  notice	  that	  the	  condition	  of	  
adequacy	  fails:	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  correspondence	  between	  the	  limit	  property,	  i.e.,	  a	  trivial	  fundamental	  
group	  and	  a	  simply	  connected	  space,	  and	  the	  property	  of	  the	  limit	  system,	  i.e.,	  a	  non-­‐trivial	  fundamental	  
group	  and	  a	  non-­‐simply	  connected	  space.	  We	  cannot	  say	  that	  our	  cubical	  space	  is	  “approximately”	  non-­‐
simply	  connected	  on	  the	  way	  to	  the	  limit	  system,	  or	  that	  it	  has	  an	  “approximate”	  fundamental	  group.	  
Instead,	  the	  space	  will	  be	  simply	  connected,	  and	  the	  fundamental	  group	  trivial,	  full	  stop.	  It	  is	  only	  at	  the	  
limit	  that	  the	  property	  of	  non-­‐simply	  connectedness	  and	  non-­‐trivial	  fundamental	  group	  arises.	  
Connectedness	  is	  a	  binary	  topological	  property.	  Either	  the	  space	  is	  connected	  or	  it	  is	  not;	  there	  is	  no	  
intermediate.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  any	  realistic	  physical	  system	  with	  some	  non-­‐zero	  height  𝑙	  
approximately	  instantiates	  the	  structure	  of	  our	  idealized	  limit	  system	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  property	  of	  
topological	  connectedness	  since	  there	  does	  not	  exist	  a	  correspondence	  between	  the	  limit	  property	  (the	  
approximation)	  and	  the	  property	  of	  the	  limit	  system	  (the	  idealization).	  
	  
4.	  Easy	  Road	  Nominalism	  Meets	  Anyons	  
	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  present	  a	  case	  study	  from	  mathematical	  physics	  which	  is	  a	  concrete	  
instance	  of	  a	  mathematical	  explanation—in	  fact,	  a	  structural	  explanation	  à	  la	  Leng	  (2012,	  989)—of	  
empirical	  phenomenon	  that	  bears	  negatively	  on	  Leng’s	  proposed	  pathway	  to	  easy	  road	  nominalism.	  I	  
will	  first	  introduce	  the	  standard	  explanatory	  story	  found	  in	  the	  physics	  literature	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  
anyons	  and	  their	  quantum	  statistics	  in	  Section	  4.1,	  and	  then	  discuss	  the	  associated	  philosophical	  issues	  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  mathematical	  explanation	  and	  indispensability	  in	  Section	  4.2.	  Looking	  ahead,	  the	  explanandum	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  What	  do	  we	  mean	  by	  “approximately”	  here?	  We	  mean	  that	  we	  can	  have	  the	  volume	  𝑉 = 𝐿!𝜀	  be	  as	  small	  as	  we	  
want	  by	  choosing	  an	  appropriate	  epsilon	  so	  that	  we	  can	  come	  as	  close	  to	  zero	  volume	  as	  we	  may	  want.	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in	  question	  will	  be	  the	  phenomena	  of	  fractional	  quantum	  statistics	  manifested	  by	  quasi-­‐particles,	  known	  
as	  anyons,	  in	  systems	  such	  as	  ones	  manifesting	  the	  fractional	  quantum	  Hall	  effect	  (FQHE).	  The	  explanans	  
will	  include	  an	  appeal	  to	  abstract	  mathematical	  structure,	  viz.,	  the	  Braid	  group	  as	  the	  fundamental	  
group	  of	  the	  wavefunction	  configuration	  space,	  which	  cannot	  be	  nominalized	  away	  through	  the	  notion	  
of	  approximate	  instantiation.	  The	  reason	  being	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  mismatch	  between	  the	  relevant	  limit	  
property	  and	  the	  corresponding	  property	  of	  the	  limit	  system	  so	  that	  our	  condition	  of	  adequacy	  will	  fail.	  
	  
4.1	  The	  Configuration	  Space	  Approach	  to	  Anyons	  and	  Fractional	  Quantum	  Statistics	  
	  
Consider	  a	  collection	  of	  non-­‐interacting,	  identical	  particles	  in	  thermal	  equilibrium.	  What	  are	  the	  possible	  
ways	  that	  such	  a	  collection	  may	  occupy	  a	  set	  of	  available	  discrete	  energy	  states?	  Roughly,	  quantum	  and	  
statistical	  mechanics	  tell	  us	  that	  there	  are	  two	  such	  ways,	  and	  that	  the	  expected	  number	  of	  particles	  in	  
some	  specific	  energy	  state	  will	  depend	  of	  the	  type	  of	  particle	  at	  hand.	  Bosons	  manifest	  a	  behavior	  
consistent	  with	  Bose-­‐Einstein	  statistics,	  while	  fermions	  distribute	  themselves	  according	  to	  Fermi-­‐Dirac	  
statistics.	  This	  division	  into	  particle	  types,	  along	  with	  corresponding	  statistics	  may	  be	  captured	  by	  what	  
has	  become	  known	  as	  the	  symmetrization/anti-­‐symmetrization	  postulate:	  “The	  states	  of	  a	  system	  
containing	  𝑁  identical	  particles	  are	  necessarily	  either	  all	  symmetrical	  or	  all	  antisymmetrical	  with	  respect	  
to	  permutation	  of	  𝑁	  particles”	  (Messiah	  (1962),	  p.	  595).20	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  a	  collection	  of	  𝑁	  identical	  
particles	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  quantum	  state	  Ψ(!,!,…,!)	  and	  the	  same	  collection	  with,	  say,	  particles	  1	  
and	  2	  permuted	  is	  represented	  by	    Ψ(!,!,…,!),	  then	  the	  symmetrization/anti-­‐symmetrization	  postulate	  
tells	  us	  that	  state	  must	  be	  related	  in	  the	  following	  manner:	  
	     Ψ(!,!,…,!) = 𝑒!"Ψ(!,!,…,!),	  
	  
where	  the	  exchange	  phase	  𝜃	  can	  take	  on	  a	  value	  of	  𝜃 = 0	  for	  a	  system	  of	  bosons	  with	  a	  corresponding	  
phase	  factor	  𝑒!" = +1	  and	  a	  symmetric	  quantum	  state,	  or	  it	  can	  take	  a	  value	  	  𝜃 = 𝜋	  for	  a	  system	  of	  
fermions	  with	  a	  corresponding	  phase	  factor	  of	  𝑒!" = −1	  and	  an	  antisymmetric	  quantum	  state.	  
There	  are	  two	  fundamental	  frameworks	  for	  understanding	  permutation	  invariance	  in	  quantum	  
mechanics,	  which	  ground	  the	  symmetrization/anti-­‐symmetrization	  postulate	  and	  its	  consequences,	  
namely,	  that	  there	  are	  two	  basic	  types	  of	  particles	  and	  quantum	  statistics.	  Following	  Landsman	  (2016)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  See	  Earman	  (2010)	  for	  a	  discussion.	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we	  will	  call	  the	  first,	  due	  to	  Messiah	  and	  Greenberg	  (1964),	  the	  operator	  framework,	  and	  the	  second,	  
due	  to,	  among	  others,	  Laidlaw	  and	  DeWitt	  (1971),	  Leinaas	  and	  Myrheim	  (1977),	  the	  configuration	  space	  
framework.	  Landsman	  (2016)	  has	  argued	  that,	  in	  dimensions	  greater	  than	  two,	  both	  frameworks	  are	  
equivalent	  and	  give	  equivalent	  verdicts	  regarding	  possible	  particle	  types	  and	  statistics.	  However,	  it	  turns	  
out	  that	  in	  two	  dimensions	  the	  configuration	  space	  framework	  allows	  the	  exchange	  phase	  to	  take	  on	  
any	  value.	  This	  permits	  the	  framework	  to	  represent	  bosons	  and	  fermions,	  as	  well	  as	  other	  particles	  
known	  as	  “anyons,”	  which	  are	  said	  to	  exhibit	  “fractional	  quantum	  statistics”	  or	  “intermediate	  quantum	  
statistics.”21	  
Recall,	  the	  manner	  by	  which	  a	  collection	  of	  identical	  particles	  occupies	  energy	  states	  will	  depend	  
on	  the	  kind	  of	  quantum	  statistics	  that	  such	  a	  collection	  manifests,	  which	  in	  turn	  depends	  on	  the	  type	  of	  
particle	  considered.	  Particle	  type	  is	  decided	  by	  how	  such	  a	  collection	  behaves	  under	  permutation,	  and	  
such	  behavior	  is	  captured	  by	  the	  value	  of	  the	  exchange	  phase	  𝜃	  and	  the	  corresponding	  phase	  factor	  𝑒!".	  
In	  short,	  on	  the	  configuration	  space	  framework,	  two	  central	  theorems	  (see	  Appendix)	  dictate	  that	  the	  
phase	  factor	  𝑒!" 	  is	  equivalent	  to	  the	  one-­‐dimensional	  unitary	  representation	  𝛾	  of	  the	  fundamental	  
group	  𝜋!  	  of	  the	  configuration	  space	  𝑄	  of	  the	  collection	  of	  identical	  particles,	  symbolized	  by	  𝛾 = 𝑒!".22	  It	  
has	  been	  shown	  by	  Artin	  (1947),	  Fadell	  and	  Neuwirth	  (1962),	  and	  Fox	  and	  Neuwirth	  (1962)	  that	  the	  
fundamental	  group	  for	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  (𝑑 = 2)	  and	  three-­‐dimensional	  (𝑑 = 3)	  cases	  are	  given	  by:	  
	   𝜋!     𝑄 = 𝐵!  for  𝑑 = 2	  𝜋!     𝑄 = 𝑆!  for  𝑑 = 3	  
	  
where	  𝑆!	  is	  the	  permutation	  group	  and	  𝐵!	  is	  the	  Braid	  group.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  three	  dimensions	  the	  
fundamental	  group	  of	  the	  configuration	  space	  is	  the	  (finite	  and	  discrete)	  permutation	  group	  𝑆!	  which	  
admits	  of	  the	  known	  one-­‐dimensional	  unitary	  representation:	  𝛾 = ±1	  (+1	  for	  bosons	  and	  −1	  for	  
fermions).	  In	  two-­‐dimensions,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  fundamental	  group	  is	  the	  (infinite	  and	  discrete)	  
braid	  group	  𝐵!	  with	  one-­‐dimensional	  unitary	  representations	  giving	  rise	  to	  phase	  factors	  of	  the	  form:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  The	  name	  is	  due	  to	  Noble	  laureate	  Frank	  Wilczek	  (1982).	  Note	  that	  anyons	  and	  fractional	  statistics	  have	  nothing	  
to	  do	  with	  so-­‐called	  paraparticles	  and	  parastatistics	  (which	  arise	  from	  higher	  dimensional	  representations	  of	  the	  
permutation	  group).	  For	  more	  on	  anyons	  see	  Wilczek	  (1990),	  Khare	  (2005),	  and	  references	  therein.	  
22	  See	  Hatcher	  (2002)	  for	  relevant	  background	  in	  algebraic	  topology.	  Roughly,	  the	  “one-­‐dimensional	  unitary	  
representation”	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  represent	  groups	  with	  numbers.	  The	  “fundamental	  group,”	  also	  known	  as	  the	  first	  
homotopy	  group,	  is	  a	  topological	  invariant	  that	  allows	  one	  to	  classify	  topological	  spaces	  according	  to	  whether	  
paths	  or	  loops	  in	  the	  space	  can	  be	  continuously	  deformed	  into	  each	  other.	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𝛾 ! = 𝑒!"where	  0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 2𝜋	  so	  that	  the	  exchange	  phase	  can	  take	  on	  a	  continuous	  range	  of	  factors	  
allowing	  for	  bosons,	  fermions,	  and	  anyons.	  
In	  the	  following	  sub-­‐section	  I	  will	  explain	  how	  the	  braid	  group,	  although	  an	  essential	  
mathematical	  element	  in	  the	  explanation	  of	  fractional	  statistics,	  cannot	  be	  approximately	  instantiated	  in	  
a	  physical	  system.	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  subsection	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  empirical	  phenomenon	  that	  calls	  for	  the	  
emergence	  of	  anyons	  and	  fractional	  statistics.	  
When	  a	  thin	  current	  carrying	  conductor	  is	  subjected	  to	  a	  perpendicular	  magnetic	  field	  𝑩 =(0, 0,𝐵),	  there	  exists	  a	  Lorentz	  force	  due	  to	  the	  magnetic	  field	  acting	  on	  the	  current,	  which	  induces	  an	  
electric	  field	  and	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  novel	  voltage	  difference,	  dubbed	  the	  “Hall	  voltage”	  𝑉!.	  This	  is	  known	  as	  
the	  Hall	  effect,	  discovered	  by	  Edwin	  Hall	  in	  1879	  (see	  Fig.	  8).	  Classically,	  and	  roughly,	  through	  Ohm’s	  law	  𝑅 = 𝑉/𝐼	  (where	  𝑅	  is	  the	  resistance,	  𝑉	  voltage	  difference	  and	  𝐼	  the	  electric	  current),	  we	  expect	  the	  
traverse	  resistance	  𝑅!",	  also	  known	  as	  the	  Hall	  resistance	  𝑅! = 𝑉!/𝐼,	  to	  vary	  linearly	  with	  the	  applied	  
magnetic	  field	  according	  to	  𝑅! = 𝐵/𝑒𝑁	  (where	  𝑒	  the	  electron	  charge	  and	  𝑁	  is	  the	  number	  of	  electrons	  
per	  unit	  area)	  and	  for	  there	  to	  be	  some	  non-­‐vanishing	  longitudinal	  resistance	  𝑅!!.	  Contrary	  to	  classical	  
expectation,	  experiments	  due	  to	  von	  Klitzing	  et	  al.	  (1980)	  and	  Tsui	  et	  al.	  (1982)	  have	  shown	  that	  (i)	  the	  
Hall	  resistance	  is	  quantized	  and	  exhibits	  plateaus	  at,	  and	  that	  (ii)	  the	  longitudinal	  resistance	  vanishes	  for,	  
values	  of	  𝑅! 	  given	  by	  𝑅! = ℎ/𝑒!𝜈	  where	  ℎ	  is	  Planck’s	  constant	  (see	  Fig.	  9).	  The	  dimensionless	  number	  𝜈—the	  so-­‐called	  “filling	  factor,”	  which	  describes	  a	  ratio	  of	  filled	  to	  vacant	  electron	  states—has	  either	  
integer	  or	  fractional	  values.	  The	  former	  case	  is	  known	  as	  the	  integral	  quantum	  Hall	  effect	  (IQHE)	  and	  the	  
latter	  case	  is	  known	  as	  the	  FQHE.23	  What	  matters	  most	  for	  our	  purposes	  is	  that	  the	  mechanism	  of	  
localization,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  quasiparticles	  that	  interacting	  with	  impurities,	  is	  appealed	  to	  in	  order	  to	  
explain	  (i)	  in	  the	  FQHE.	  Importantly,	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  by	  Avoras	  et	  al.	  (1984)	  that	  such	  quasi-­‐particles	  
have	  fractional	  quantum	  statistics	  and	  thus	  are	  anyons.	  Recent	  experimental	  observations	  include	  
Camino	  et	  al.	  (2005).	  
	  
4.2	  Explaining	  Fractional	  Quantum	  Statistics	  
	  
What	  explains	  the	  emergences	  of	  anyons,	  i.e.,	  particles	  obeying	  fractional	  quantum	  statistics,	  
and	  is	  this	  an	  example	  of	  a	  mathematical	  explanation?	  The	  standard	  story	  found	  in	  the	  physics	  literature	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  For	  more	  on	  the	  quantum	  Hall	  effect	  see	  Chakraborty	  and	  Pietilinen	  (1995),	  Fradkin	  (2013,	  Ch.	  13),	  Ezawa	  (2013)	  
and	  Stern	  (2008),	  and	  for	  recent	  philosophical	  assessments	  see	  Bain	  (2013,	  2016),	  Guay	  and	  Sartenaer	  (2016a,	  
2016b),	  Lancaster	  and	  Pexton	  (2015),	  Lederer	  (2015),	  and	  Shech	  (2015).	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is	  that	  it	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  fundamental	  group	  of	  the	  configuration	  space	  of	  identical	  
particles	  in	  two	  dimensions	  is	  the	  braid	  group  𝐵!,	  and	  not	  the	  permutation	  group	  𝑆!,	  that	  we	  can	  have	  
anyons	  and	  fractional	  statistics.24	  
	  
Fig.	  8	  The	  Hall	  effect.	  	  A	  current	  𝐼  runs	  through	  a	  thin	  metal	  conductor	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  uniform	  
magnetic	  field	  𝑩.	  There	  exist	  a	  novel	  voltage	  drop	  𝑉! 	  that	  can	  be	  experimentally	  observed	  and	  varies	  





Fig.	  9	  Hall	  resistance	  𝑅! ≡ 𝑅!"	  and	  longitudinal	  resistance	  𝑅!!   as	  a	  function	  of	  applied	  magnetic	  field.	  
From	  Stern	  (2008,	  207).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  For	  example,	  “…in	  two	  dimensions,	  the	  space	  is	  multiply	  connected	  which	  results	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  …	  
intermediate	  statistics”	  (Khare	  2004,	  5;	  original	  emphasis).	  By	  “intermediate	  statistics”	  the	  author	  is	  referring	  to	  
“fractional	  statistics,”	  and	  by	  “multiply	  connectedness”	  of	  space	  is	  meant	  “non-­‐simply	  connected”	  space.	  Details	  
are	  provided	  in	  the	  appendix,	  but	  a	  mere	  glance	  at	  the	  literature	  (e.g.,	  Pachos	  (2012),	  Rao	  (2001))	  will	  confirm	  that	  
indeed	  appeals	  to	  a	  two	  dimensional	  topological	  structure	  is	  the	  standard	  explanation	  in	  the	  literature	  and	  




Moreover,	  we	  have	  to	  appeal	  to	  abstract	  mathematical	  structure,	  the	  fundamental	  group	  as	  the	  braid	  
group  𝐵!,	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  a	  physical	  phenomenon,	  specifically,	  fractional	  statistics	  (as	  they	  arise	  in	  
physical	  FQHE	  systems).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  said	  structure	  is	  essentially	  abstract.	  It	  is	  solely	  in	  
two	  dimensions	  that	  the	  fundamental	  group	  is	  the	  braid	  group.	  In	  three	  dimensions	  the	  structure	  
allowing	  for	  fractional	  statistics	  disappears.	  
Hence,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  explanation	  of	  anyons	  is	  in	  essence	  a	  mathematical	  and	  structural	  
explanation,	  since	  it	  is	  the	  topological	  structure	  of	  the	  configuration	  space	  (of	  identical	  particles)	  that	  
allows	  for	  fractional	  statistics.	  Moreover,	  such	  a	  case	  fits	  well	  with	  similar	  explanatory	  notions	  including	  
“asymptotic	  explanation”	  (Batterman	  2002),	  “topological	  explanation”	  (Nounou	  2003),	  and	  “minimal	  
model	  explanation”	  (Batterman	  and	  Collins	  2014)	  in	  the	  following	  manner:	  these	  accounts	  call	  for	  an	  
explanation	  of	  a	  general	  pattern	  portrayed	  by	  phenomena,	  instead	  of	  explanations	  of	  particular	  
instances	  of	  pattern	  (as	  one	  may	  gain	  with	  a	  standard	  deductive-­‐nomological	  or	  causal-­‐mechanistic	  
account	  of	  explanation).25	  In	  the	  context	  of	  our	  discussion,	  the	  reason	  that	  all	  FQHE	  system	  can	  manifest	  
fractional	  statistics,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  many	  varying	  details	  (apparatus,	  materials,	  varying	  parameters,	  
initial	  and	  boundary	  conditions,	  etc.),	  is	  that	  in	  all	  such	  systems	  are	  represented	  with	  the	  same	  
topological	  structure.	  
Connecting	  with	  Leng’s	  (2010,	  2012)	  notion	  of	  structural	  explanation	  we	  may	  say	  that	  (a)	  
physical	  FQHE	  systems	  instantiated	  the	  structure	  corresponding	  to	  the	  configuration	  space	  of	  identical	  
particles	  in	  two-­‐dimensions	  (since	  there	  is	  little	  to	  no	  motion	  in	  the	  third	  spatial	  direction),	  and	  that	  (b)	  
the	  existence	  of	  fractional	  statistics	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  two	  facts:	  (i)	  The	  phase	  factor	  characterizing	  
quantum	  statistics	  is	  the	  one-­‐dimensional	  unitary	  representation	  of	  the	  fundamental	  group	  of	  a	  
system’s	  configuration	  space	  and	  (ii)	  in	  two	  dimensions	  the	  fundamental	  group	  is	  the	  Braid	  group.	  
However,	  and	  importantly,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  clear	  that	  we	  can	  dispense	  with	  reifying	  the	  explanatory	  
mathematical	  structure.	  The	  reason	  is	  that,	  although	  FQHE	  systems	  are	  approximately	  two-­‐dimensional,	  
and	  although	  the	  do	  seem	  to	  manifest	  behavior	  consistent	  with	  fractional	  statistics;	  still,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
case	  that	  the	  mathematical	  structure	  is	  “approximately	  instantiated,”	  as	  Leng’s	  account	  necessitates.	  
The	  fundamental	  group	  of	  the	  configuration	  space	  of	  identical	  particles	  in	  approximately	  two	  
dimensions	  is	  the	  same	  as	  that	  of	  three	  dimensions,	  the	  permutation	  group  𝑆!.	  In	  order	  to	  allow	  for	  
fractional	  statistics	  we	  need	  the	  fundamental	  group	  to	  be	  the	  Braid	  group	  𝐵!,	  and	  this	  can	  only	  occur	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  See	  Hempel	  and	  Oppenheim	  (1948)	  for	  the	  deductive-­‐nomological	  account	  of	  explanation	  and	  see,	  for	  example,	  
Salmon	  (1984)	  and	  Woodward	  (2003)	  for	  causal	  accounts.	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exactly	  two	  dimensions.	  Yet,	  physical	  systems	  are	  not	  exactly	  two-­‐dimensional.	  Thus,	  it	  cannot	  be	  said	  
that	  a	  physical	  system	  “approximately	  instantiates”	  the	  Braid	  group	  structure	  necessary	  for	  fractional	  
statistics.	  Said	  differently,	  by	  appealing	  to	  Leng’s	  expounded	  account	  via	  Norton’s	  distinction,	  the	  anyon	  
case	  study	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  mismatch	  between	  a	  property	  of	  a	  limit	  system,	  i.e.,	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  
system	  with	  fundamental	  group	  that	  is	  the	  Braid	  group	  𝐵!,	  and	  the	  corresponding	  physical	  limit	  
property,	  i.e.,	  the	  fundamental	  group	  as	  the	  permutation	  group	  𝑆!.	  It	  is	  only	  in	  two	  dimensions	  that	  the	  
fundamental	  group	  is	  the	  Braid	  group	  𝐵!,	  which	  makes	  room	  also	  for	  anyons	  with	  their	  fractional	  
quantum	  statistics.	  Since	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  correspondence	  between	  the	  property	  of	  the	  limit	  system	  and	  
the	  limit	  property,	  our	  condition	  of	  adequacy	  from	  above	  is	  not	  satisfied.	  Hence,	  one	  can	  no	  longer	  talk	  
about	  the	  mathematical	  structure	  being	  approximately	  instantiated	  by	  the	  physical	  system.	  It	  is	  then	  not	  
clear	  how,	  on	  Leng’s	  approach,	  one	  could	  dispense	  with	  reification	  in	  this	  context	  without	  undertaking	  
the	  hard	  road	  to	  nominalism.	  
One	  may	  perhaps	  expect	  Leng	  to	  anticipate	  the	  type	  of	  objection	  raised	  here	  by	  an	  
indispensable	  infinitesimal	  idealization.	  Reflecting	  on	  Maddy’s	  (1997)	  discussion	  of	  the	  continuum	  
model	  of	  fluids	  as	  an	  indispensable	  idealization,	  Leng	  (2010,	  120-­‐121)	  says:	  
	  
.	  .	  .	  we	  have	  a	  case	  of	  an	  essential	  idealization.	  .	  .	  If	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  it	  looks	  as	  if	  the	  hypothesis	  
that	  there	  are	  ideal,	  presumably	  abstract,	  fluids	  about	  which	  our	  theory	  of	  fluid	  dynamics	  
asserts	  truths	  is	  indispensable	  to	  our	  best	  theoretical	  account	  of	  the	  behavior	  of	  physical	  fluids.	  .	  
.	  But	  hold	  on	  a	  minute!	  Aren’t	  our	  theoretical	  assumptions	  about	  ideal	  fluids	  still	  rather	  like	  our	  
theoretical	  assumptions	  about	  ideal	  point	  masses	  or	  ideal	  frictionless	  planes?	  Shouldn’t	  we	  
expect	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  success	  of	  our	  theory	  of	  ideal	  fluids	  to	  be	  analogous	  to	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  success	  of	  these	  other	  theories?	  .	  .	  .	  Given	  that	  we	  know	  of	  cases	  where	  
the	  success	  of	  a	  theory	  is	  not	  due	  to	  the	  actual	  existence	  of	  the	  ideal	  objects	  it	  hypothesizes,	  but	  
rather	  due	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  convenient	  “myths’”	  allow	  us	  to	  represent	  some	  facts	  
about	  real	  objects,	  is	  this	  not	  enough	  to	  throw	  into	  question	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  ideal	  
continuous	  fluids	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  confirmed	  by	  the	  success	  of	  fluid	  dynamics?	  	  
	  
It	  seems	  to	  me	  that,	  unless	  one	  can	  successfully	  apply	  a	  developed	  NSR	  account,	  such	  as	  the	  expounded	  
version	  of	  Leng’s	  approach,	  then	  the	  default	  answers	  to	  such	  questions—in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  case	  study	  





5.	  Nominalistic	  Objections	  
	  
I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  case	  of	  fractional	  statistics	  includes	  a	  genuine	  mathematical	  explanation	  that	  
appeals	  indispensably	  to	  a	  mathematical	  structure	  that	  cannot	  be	  dispensed	  with	  via	  talk	  about	  
“approximate	  instantiation.”	  In	  this	  section	  I	  wish	  to	  consider	  three	  nominalist	  objections.	  
	  
5.1	  First	  Objection:	  The	  Dilemma	  
	  
One	  may	  object	  that	  my	  account	  in	  this	  paper	  faces	  the	  following	  dilemma:	  Either	  physical	  
systems	  approximately	  instantiate	  the	  structure	  needed	  to	  derive	  fractional	  statistics	  according	  to	  the	  
standard	  story	  (given	  in	  Section	  4)—whatever	  may	  be	  meant	  by	  “approximate	  instantiation”—or	  not.	  If	  
so,	  then	  Leng’s	  easy	  road	  nominalism	  succeeds.	  If	  not,	  then	  I	  have	  only	  succeeded	  in	  showing	  that	  the	  
standard	  explanatory	  story	  regarding	  the	  emergence	  of	  anyons	  via	  the	  configuration	  space	  framework	  is	  
deficient.	  In	  reply,	  let	  us	  consider	  each	  horn	  in	  turn.	  First,	  I	  have	  noted	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  “approximate	  
instantiation”	  is	  vague,	  and	  have	  shown	  that	  when	  we	  expound	  on	  that	  account	  using	  Norton’s	  well-­‐
received	  distinction	  between	  approximation	  and	  idealization,	  we	  learn	  that	  physical	  systems	  cannot	  
approximately	  instantiate	  the	  braid	  group	  structure	  needed	  to	  derive	  anyons.	  It	  is	  now	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  
defender	  of	  Leng-­‐style	  NSR	  to	  offer	  a	  legitimate	  non-­‐ad	  hoc	  characterization	  of	  “approximate	  
instantiation.”	  Without	  such	  a	  characterization,	  the	  default	  position	  ought	  to	  be	  that	  Leng’s	  path	  to	  easy	  
road	  has	  been	  blocked.	  Having	  said	  that,	  it	  is	  legitimate	  to	  consider	  why	  physicists	  think	  that	  systems	  
portraying	  the	  FQHE	  are	  approximately	  two-­‐dimensional	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  salvage	  Leng’s	  account.	  Since	  it	  
is	  conceded	  that	  actual	  FQHE	  systems	  portraying	  fractional	  statistics	  are	  actually	  three-­‐dimensional,	  the	  
claim	  then	  is	  that	  the	  systems	  are	  “dynamically	  two-­‐dimensional”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  motion	  in	  the	  third-­‐
dimension	  is	  quantized	  and	  constrained.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  create	  systems	  in	  the	  laboratory	  
that	  are	  dynamically,	  effectively	  two-­‐dimensional,	  or	  even	  one-­‐	  or	  zero-­‐dimensional.	  The	  reason	  is	  that,	  
in	  accordance	  with	  the	  third	  law	  of	  thermodynamics,	  all	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  freeze	  out	  in	  the	  limit	  of	  
zero	  temperature.	  This	  means	  that	  we	  can	  approximately	  confine	  electrons	  to	  two-­‐dimensional	  surfaces,	  
one-­‐dimensional	  lines,	  or	  even	  to	  zero-­‐dimensional	  points,	  if	  we	  have	  a	  strongly	  confining	  potential	  
and/or	  sufficiently	  low	  temperatures	  such	  that	  the	  excitation	  energy	  in	  one	  or	  more	  directions	  may	  be	  
greater	  than	  the	  average	  thermal	  energy	  of	  the	  particles.	  Consider	  an	  illustration	  with	  a	  two-­‐
dimensional	  electron	  gas	  such	  as	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  quantum	  Hall	  effects:	  	  
The	  electrons	  are	  confined	  to	  the	  surface	  of	  a	  semiconductor	  by	  a	  strong	  electric	  field,	  and	  they	  
move	  more	  or	  less	  freely	  along	  the	  surface.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  energy  𝐸	  required	  to	  excite	  
motion	  in	  the	  direction	  perpendicular	  to	  the	  surface	  is	  of	  the	  order	  of	  several	  milli-­‐electron-­‐Volt	  
(𝑚𝑒𝑉).	  Now	  at	  a	  temperature	  of	  say  𝑇 = 1𝐾,	  the	  thermal	  energy	  is	  𝑘𝑇,	  where	  𝑘	  is	  the	  
Boltzmann	  constant.	  Thus	  if	  the	  transverse	  excitation	  energy	  is	  say	  10  𝑚𝑒𝑉,	  then	  the	  fraction	  of	  
electrons	  in	  the	  lowest	  excited	  transverse	  energy	  level	  is	  𝑒! !!" = 𝑒!!"" ≈ 10!!!,	  which	  is	  zero	  




Prominent	  examples	  of	  dynamically	  two-­‐dimensional	  systems	  include	  carriers	  confined	  to	  the	  
vicinity	  of	  junctions	  between	  insulators	  and	  semiconductors,	  between	  layers	  of	  different	  
semiconductors,	  and	  between	  vacuum	  and	  liquid	  helium,	  as	  well	  as	  layer	  compounds,	  intercalated	  
graphite,	  and	  thin	  films.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  and	  in	  reply,	  these	  systems	  are	  not	  exactly	  two-­‐dimensional	  so	  that	  truly	  two-­‐
dimensional	  systems	  are	  idealizations	  or	  fictions	  of	  sorts.	  Ando	  et	  al.	  (1982,	  439)	  explains:	  	  
	  
These	  [dynamically,	  approximately	  two-­‐dimensional]	  systems	  are	  not	  two-­‐dimensional	  in	  a	  strict	  
sense,	  both	  because	  the	  wave	  functions	  have	  a	  finite	  spatial	  extent	  in	  the	  third	  dimension	  and	  
because	  electromagnetic	  fields	  are	  not	  confined	  to	  a	  place	  but	  spill	  out	  into	  the	  third	  dimension.	  
Theoretical	  prediction	  for	  idealized	  two-­‐dimensional	  systems	  must	  therefore	  be	  modified	  before	  
they	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  experiment.	  
	  
Perhaps,	  exact	  dynamically	  two-­‐dimensional	  systems	  could	  be	  concocted	  at	  absolute	  zero	  temperature.	  
The	  problem	  is	  that,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  third	  law,	  unless	  you	  have	  infinite	  time	  and	  resources,	  it	  is	  
impossible	  to	  reach	  absolute	  zero	  temperature.	  This	  result	  was	  recently	  derived	  in	  Masenes	  and	  
Oppenheim	  (2017).	  All	  this	  is	  to	  emphasize	  that	  systems	  that	  are	  dynamically	  two-­‐dimensional,	  such	  as	  
systems	  manifesting	  the	  quantum	  Hall	  effects,	  are	  not	  exactly	  two-­‐dimensional—there	  is	  always	  some	  
non-­‐zero	  probability	  of	  an	  excitation	  in	  the	  third	  dimension.	  	  
But	  why	  do	  we	  need	  the	  system	  to	  be	  exactly,	  dynamically	  two-­‐dimensional	  and	  not	  just	  two-­‐
dimensional	  “for	  all	  practical	  purposes?”	  Recall	  our	  derivation	  of	  anyons	  from	  Section	  4.1.	  On	  the	  
configuration	  space	  approach	  to	  permutation	  invariance	  in	  QM,	  anyons	  arise	  when	  the	  fundamental	  
group	  of	  the	  configuration	  space	  is	  the	  braid	  group	  and	  this	  happens	  only	  for	  two-­‐dimensions:	  𝜋! 𝑄   =𝐵!  for  𝑑 = 2.	  For	  a	  three-­‐dimensional	  system	  that	  is	  only	  effectively	  two-­‐dimensional	  the	  fundamental	  
group	  is	  the	  symmetry	  group,	  i.e.,	  	  𝜋!     𝑄 = 𝑆!  for  𝑑 = 3,	  and	  thus	  the	  mathematical	  structure	  is	  not	  
rich	  enough	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  anyons	  and	  fractional	  statistics.	  Analogously,	  considering	  the	  toy-­‐example	  
from	  Section	  3,	  it	  is	  only	  when	  we	  reach	  the	  limit	  system	  and	  have	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  square	  that	  we	  
have	  a	  non-­‐simply	  connected	  space	  and	  a	  non-­‐trivial	  fundamental	  group.	  For	  any	  three-­‐dimensional	  
cuboid,	  no	  matter	  how	  close	  the	  height	  is	  to	  zero,	  we	  have	  a	  simply	  connected	  space	  and	  a	  trivial	  
fundamental	  group.	  
To	  be	  clear,	  it	  is	  not	  assumed	  that	  the	  configuration	  space	  of	  a	  system	  is	  the	  physical	  space	  that	  
it	  occupies.	  Whatever	  one	  thinks	  about	  the	  ontology	  of	  configuration	  space	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  
fundamental	  physical	  space,	  at	  the	  very	  least	  the	  configuration	  space	  of	  a	  system	  represents	  the	  
possible	  ways	  that	  particles	  can	  be	  arranged	  in	  physical	  space,	  i.e.,	  the	  possible	  dynamics	  of	  the	  system.	  
21	  
	  
If	  a	  system’s	  configuration	  space	  is	  two-­‐dimensional,	  then	  the	  probability	  that	  one	  will	  find	  a	  particle	  
located	  in	  the	  third	  dimension	  in	  physical	  space	  is	  zero.	  	  But	  the	  probability	  that	  one	  will	  find	  a	  particle	  in	  
the	  third	  dimension	  in	  physical	  space	  in	  systems	  that	  manifest	  the	  FQHE	  is	  not	  zero	  (although	  it	  is	  
extremely	  low,	  e.g.,	  on	  the	  order	  of	  10!!!).26	  
Regarding	  the	  second	  horn,	  which	  rejects	  the	  standard	  explanatory	  story,	  what	  is	  important	  
here	  is	  to	  note	  the	  motivation	  for	  such	  a	  rejection.	  Insofar	  as	  the	  motivation	  is	  to	  save	  Leng’s	  approach,	  
then	  the	  charge	  of	  explanatory	  deficiency	  is	  no	  more	  than	  question	  begging:	  if	  the	  standard	  
explanatory	  story	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  anyons	  does	  not	  support	  Leng-­‐style	  nominalism,	  then	  so	  much	  
the	  worse	  for	  Leng’s	  approach.	  	  Similarly,	  if	  the	  motivation	  for	  rejecting	  the	  standard	  story	  is	  that	  it	  
does	  not	  bode	  well	  with	  one’s	  favorite	  account	  of	  scientific	  explanation,	  so	  much	  worse	  for	  one’s	  
favorite	  account.	  The	  viewpoint	  advocated	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  that	  “we	  should	  take	  the	  actual	  explanatory	  
practices	  of	  scientists	  seriously	  when	  constructing	  our	  philosophical	  accounts	  of	  scientific	  explanation”	  
(Bokulich	  2008,	  223-­‐224).	  Likewise,	  the	  “job	  of	  philosophers	  of	  science	  and	  mathematics	  is	  to	  help	  
make	  sense	  of,	  and	  contribute	  to,	  science	  and	  mathematics	  as	  practiced.	  The	  role	  of	  philosophers	  is	  not	  
to	  overrule	  the	  pronouncements	  of	  mathematics	  and	  science	  on	  philosophical	  grounds	  …”	  (Colyvan	  
2012b,	  78;	  original	  emphasis).	  
	  Last,	  one’s	  motivation	  may	  have	  to	  do	  with	  what	  we	  take	  to	  be	  a	  justification	  for	  an	  appeal	  to	  
idealizations.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  if	  there	  is	  a	  mismatch	  between	  a	  property	  of	  a	  limit	  system	  and	  a	  
corresponding	  limit	  property,	  so	  that	  the	  condition	  of	  adequacy	  of	  Section	  4	  is	  not	  satisfied,	  then	  we	  
are	  not	  justified	  in	  appealing	  to	  the	  property	  of	  the	  limit	  system	  in	  accounting	  or	  explaining	  some	  
phenomenon	  of	  interests.	  Perhaps	  future	  work	  in	  mathematical	  physics	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  
notions	  such	  as	  “approximately	  non-­‐simply	  connected”	  or	  “approximate	  Braid	  group	  structure,”	  or	  
perchance	  we	  will	  discovery	  distinct	  ways	  of	  deriving	  anyonic	  behavior,	  at	  which	  point	  Leng’s	  approach	  
to	  easy	  road	  nominalism	  will	  succeed.	  Until	  then,	  we	  lack	  a	  justified	  explanation	  of	  anyons	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  An	  anonymous	  referee	  presses	  further:	  One	  wonders	  where	  the	  actual	  explanation	  arises.	  What	  seems	  to	  be	  
doing	  the	  explaining	  is	  that	  the	  phase	  factors	  are	  what	  they	  are.	  There	  is	  of	  course	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  braid	  
group	  and	  the	  phase	  factors—the	  approximately	  two-­‐dimensional	  character	  of	  the	  configuration	  space	  removes	  
the	  extra	  constraints	  on	  phase	  factors	  that	  arise	  in	  three-­‐dimensions,	  constraints	  that	  prevent	  fractional	  statistics.	  
Otherwise	  what	  is	  the	  motivation	  for	  thinking	  that	  the	  best	  explanation	  for	  what	  is	  going	  on	  here	  is	  the	  
mathematical	  fact	  appealed	  to?	  My	  reply	  is	  that,	  first,	  it	  is	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  character	  of	  the	  configuration	  
space—not	  the	  “approximately”	  two-­‐dimensional	  character—that	  removes	  the	  constraint	  on	  phase	  factors	  arising	  
in	  three-­‐dimensions.	  Second,	  this	  is	  the	  only	  explanation	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  anyons—the	  sole	  (developed)	  
account	  of	  their	  theoretic	  possibility	  (to	  my	  best	  knowledge)—and	  the	  received	  explanation	  among	  the	  scientific	  
community.	  I	  argue	  that	  if	  we	  take	  this	  explanation	  at	  face	  value	  it	  blocks	  Leng’s	  approach	  to	  easy	  road	  
nominalism.	  I	  do	  not	  deny	  that	  an	  easy	  road	  nominalist	  could	  reject	  the	  standard	  story	  and	  seek	  an	  alternative	  
one,	  e.g.,	  via	  future	  theory.	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fractional	  statistics.	  Generally,	  I	  am	  sympathetic	  to	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  (Shech	  (2015)).	  However,	  it	  
must	  be	  noted	  that	  it	  is	  conjectural	  and	  depends	  on	  speculations	  regarding	  what	  shape	  future	  scientific	  
theory	  may	  take.	  One	  may	  certainly	  retort	  as	  above	  and	  note	  that,	  first,	  appeals	  to	  an	  indispensable	  
and	  essentially	  idealized	  topological	  structure	  constitute	  the	  main	  ingredient	  in	  the	  received	  
explanatory	  story	  of	  fractional	  statistics.	  Second,	  as	  philosophers	  we	  need	  to	  take	  our	  current	  best	  
science	  seriously	  and,	  thus,	  the	  default	  position	  ought	  to	  be	  that	  Leng’s	  pathway	  to	  easy	  road	  
nominalism	  has	  been	  blocked.	  
	  
5.2	  Second	  Objection:	  An	  Anomaly	  
	  
One	  may	  worry	  that	  the	  case	  study	  that	  I	  have	  discussed	  is	  sufficiently	  narrow	  in	  scope	  and	  specially	  
chosen	  so	  as	  not	  to	  warrant	  much	  attention.	  It	  is	  an	  anomaly	  and	  not	  part	  of	  the	  repertoire	  of	  our	  best	  
scientific	  theories,	  so	  the	  claim	  goes.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  
	   First,	  although	  the	  phenomena	  of	  fractional	  statistics	  and	  the	  FQHE	  have	  been	  largely	  ignored	  by	  
both	  philosophers	  of	  mathematics	  and	  science,	  the	  same	  is	  not	  true	  of	  the	  scientific	  community.	  For	  
instance,	  	  publications	  having	  to	  do	  with	  the	  quantum	  Hall	  effect	  have	  averaged	  at	  about	  one	  
publication	  per	  day	  as	  of	  1995	  (von	  Klitzing	  2004).	  Moreover,	  insofar	  as	  the	  explanation	  of	  fractional	  
quantum	  statistics	  is	  topological	  in	  nature,	  since	  it	  is	  an	  appeal	  to	  an	  idealized	  and	  abstract	  topological	  
structure	  that	  is	  doing	  the	  explanatory	  work,	  it	  is	  only	  one	  instance	  of	  many	  such	  “topological	  
effects.”27	  For	  example,	  the	  well-­‐known	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  Aharonov-­‐Bohm	  (AB)	  effect	  (Ahararonov	  
and	  Bohm	  1959)	  is	  standardly	  identified	  as	  topological	  in	  nature.28	  	  The	  effect	  concerns	  a	  shift	  in	  an	  
interference	  pattern,	  manifested	  by	  a	  beam	  of	  electrons	  in	  double-­‐slit	  experiments,	  due	  to	  presence	  of	  
an	  isolated	  magnetic	  field.	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  mathematical	  structure	  playing	  an	  indispensable	  
explanatory	  role	  is	  the	  topological	  structure	  of	  the	  electron	  configuration	  space.	  However,	  in	  analogous	  
manner	  to	  the	  case	  of	  fractional	  statistics,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  mathematical	  structure	  can	  be	  
approximately	  instantiated	  by	  the	  physical	  structure.	  This	  is	  so	  because	  it	  is	  standardly	  claimed	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  As	  texts	  with	  titles	  such	  as	  Topological	  Effects	  in	  Quantum	  Mechanics	  	  (Afanasiec	  1999)	  and	  Introduction	  to	  
Topological	  Quantum	  Computation	  (Pachos	  2012)	  confirm.	  In	  fact,	  the	  2016	  Nobel	  Prize	  in	  Physics	  was	  awarded	  to	  
David	  J.	  Thouless,	  F.	  Duncan	  M.	  Haldane,	  and	  J.	  Michael	  Kosterlitz	  for	  theoretical	  discoveries	  of	  topological	  phase	  
transitions	  and	  topological	  phases	  of	  matter.	  
28	  It	  is	  of	  special	  interest	  to	  philosophers	  because	  it	  seems	  to	  portray	  a	  type	  of	  quantum	  non-­‐locality	  (since	  the	  
magnetic	  field	  affects	  a	  beam	  of	  electrons	  while	  being	  confined	  to	  a	  region	  where	  the	  beam	  is	  not)	  and	  raises	  a	  
host	  of	  interpretive	  issues	  regarding	  ontology	  and	  indeterminism	  in	  classical	  electromagnetism	  and	  quantum	  
mechanics.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Healey	  (2007),	  Maudling	  (1998),	  Mattingly	  (2006)	  (and	  references	  within)	  for	  some	  of	  
the	  philosophical	  literature.	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AB	  effect	  can	  only	  occur	  in	  a	  non-­‐simply	  connected	  configuration	  space,	  but	  the	  configuration	  space	  
corresponding	  to	  the	  AB	  effect	  setup	  as	  it	  arises	  in	  the	  laboratory	  is	  not	  non-­‐simply	  connected	  nor	  
approximately	  non-­‐simply	  connected	  (for	  the	  reasons	  stated	  in	  Section	  3).29	  
	   One	  may	  object	  that	  the	  AB	  effect	  is	  not	  topological.	  For	  instance,	  Katanaev	  (2011)	  puts	  forth	  a	  
“geometric”	  interpretation	  of	  the	  AB	  effect.	  Moreover,	  Noble	  laureate	  Robert	  Laughlin’s	  (1983)	  original	  
account	  of	  the	  FQHE	  appeals	  to	  localization	  in	  the	  form	  of	  fractionally	  charged	  quasiparticles	  
interacting	  with	  impurities	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  (part	  of)	  the	  FQHE	  and,	  importantly,	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  
that	  fractional	  statistics	  are	  the	  results	  of	  an	  AB	  effect-­‐type	  phase	  picked	  up	  by	  the	  particles	  when	  they	  
circle	  each	  other	  (Arovas	  et	  al.	  1984).	  If	  the	  AB	  effect	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  non-­‐topological	  effect,	  
then	  can’t	  the	  FQHE,	  along	  with	  anyons	  and	  fractional	  statistics,	  be	  explained	  without	  appeals	  to	  
topology?	  My	  reply	  comes	  in	  three	  parts.	  First,	  although	  I’m	  very	  much	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  
AB	  effect	  is	  not	  topological	  in	  nature	  it	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  non-­‐trivial	  to	  argue	  for	  such	  a	  position	  (as	  is	  clear	  
from	  Earman	  (2017)	  and	  my	  own	  Shech	  (2015,	  2017))	  and,	  in	  any	  case,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  well-­‐received	  
standard	  interpretation.	  Second,	  the	  problem	  is	  exacerbated	  in	  the	  context	  of	  anyons	  and	  fractional	  
statistics	  since,	  as	  emphasized	  above,	  the	  explanatory	  story	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  anyons	  told	  in	  Section	  
4.1	  shows	  that	  fractional	  statistics	  arise	  from	  the	  topological	  braid	  group	  structure.	  In	  fact,	  both	  
Laughlin	  (1983)	  and	  Arovas	  et	  al.	  (1984)	  assume	  that	  they	  are	  working	  with	  a	  exactly	  two-­‐dimensional	  
system,	  and	  in	  such	  systems	  we	  know	  that	  anyons	  can	  emerge.	  Third,	  I	  am	  not	  arguing	  that	  nominalists	  
cannot	  appeal	  to	  an	  alternative	  non-­‐topological	  explanation	  of	  anyons,	  fractional	  statistics,	  and	  the	  
FQHE.	  This	  option	  is	  certainly	  open	  to	  the	  nominalist	  and	  amounts	  to	  what	  I	  called	  the	  “second	  horn”	  
(in	  Section	  5.1).	  What	  I	  am	  saying	  is	  that	  such	  an	  explanation	  is	  conjectural	  and	  depends	  on	  
speculations	  regarding	  what	  shape	  future	  scientific	  theory	  may	  take.	  	  
	   Further,	  setting	  aside	  effects	  identified	  as	  “topological,”	  the	  problems	  for	  nominalists	  (of	  the	  
NSR	  kind)	  raised	  in	  this	  paper	  may	  arise	  generally	  in	  instances	  where	  an	  appeal	  to	  an	  idealization	  that	  is	  
indispensable	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  account	  for	  some	  physical	  phenomenon.30	  One	  example	  widely	  
discussed	  includes	  the	  standard	  characterization	  of	  phase	  transition	  (such	  as	  a	  steaming	  cup	  of	  coffee)	  
by	  our	  best	  scientific	  theories.31	  In	  brief,	  phase	  transitions	  arising	  in	  some	  physical	  system	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  This	  claim	  is	  commonly	  found	  in	  both	  the	  scientific	  (e.g.,	  Aharonov	  and	  Bohm	  (1959,	  490),	  Wu	  and	  Yang	  (1975,	  
3854	  ),	  Peshkin	  and	  Tonomura	  (1989,	  27),	  Ryder	  (1996,	  102))	  and	  philosophical	  (e.g.	  Batterman	  (2003),	  Nounou	  
(2003))	  literature.	  It	  is	  rejected	  by,	  e.g.,	  Healey	  (2007),	  Earman	  (2017),	  Shech	  (2017).	  
30	  Batterman	  (2002)	  and	  Bokulich	  (2008)	  discus	  such	  examples.	  
31	  Such	  theories	  include	  mean-­‐field	  theory,	  Yang-­‐Lee’s	  theory,	  Landau’s	  approach	  and	  renormalization	  group	  
methods.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  philosophical	  debate	  revolving	  around	  phase	  transitions	  see	  Batterman	  (2005),	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mathematically	  represented	  by	  a	  non-­‐analytic	  partition	  function	  pertaining	  to	  the	  system.32	  However,	  
for	  any	  system	  with	  finite	  many	  particles	  (degrees	  of	  freedom)	  the	  partition	  function	  is	  analytic.	  The	  
standard	  solution	  is	  to	  take	  an	  infinite	  limit	  in	  which	  the	  number	  of	  particles	  and	  volume	  of	  the	  system	  
diverges,	  but	  the	  density	  remains	  constant.	  It	  is	  then	  claimed	  by	  authoritative	  figures	  that	  the	  
“existence	  of	  a	  phase	  transition	  requires	  an	  infinite	  system.	  No	  phase	  transitions	  occur	  in	  systems	  with	  
a	  finite	  number	  of	  degrees	  of	  freedom”	  (Kadanoff	  	  2000,	  38).	  “This	  idealization	  is	  necessary	  because	  
only	  infinite	  systems	  exhibit	  sharp	  phase	  transitions”	  (Ruelle	  2004,	  2).	  This	  type	  of	  example,	  which	  
differs	  from	  standard	  appeals	  to	  idealizations,	  merits	  attention	  from	  philosophers	  of	  mathematics	  
partaking	  in	  the	  easy	  road	  nominalism	  debate	  because	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  clear	  that	  one	  can	  wave	  away	  
commitment	  to	  abstract	  mathematical	  structure	  with	  talk	  about	  “nominalistic	  content”	  and	  
“approximate	  instantiation.”	  	  
	  
5.3	  Third	  Objection:	  Carrying	  the	  Explanatory	  Load	  
	  
Recently,	  Baron	  (2016)	  has	  attempted	  to	  break	  the	  explanatory	  symmetry	  between	  idealizations	  and	  
mathematics	  by	  noting	  that,	  although	  idealizations	  play	  an	  indispensible	  explanatory	  role	  in	  our	  best	  
sciences,	  they	  do	  not	  carry	  the	  explanatory	  load	  (while	  abstract	  mathematical	  structure	  may	  carry	  the	  
explanatory	  load).	  His	  idea	  is	  that	  we	  can	  identify	  which	  indispensable	  explanatory	  parts	  of	  our	  
scientific	  explanations	  carry	  the	  explanatory	  load	  via	  a	  difference	  making	  account	  cashed	  out	  in	  terms	  
of	  counterfactuals	  (Baron	  2016,	  372):	  
	  
Explanatory	  load	  A	  statement	  S	  that	  is	  (i)	  about	  some	  Fs	  and	  (ii)	  is	  a	  part	  of	  an	  explanation	  E	  of	  
some	  phenomenon	  P	  is	  helping	  to	  carry	  the	  explanatory	  load	  iff	  F	  makes	  a	  difference	  to	  P.	  
Difference-­‐making	  F	  makes	  a	  difference	  to	  P	  iff	  had	  F	  not	  been	  the	  case,	  P	  would	  not	  have	  been	  
the	  case.	  
	  
To	  being,	  I	  think	  de	  Bianchi	  (2016)	  has	  adequately	  replied	  to	  Baron	  (2016).	  I	  take	  it	  that	  one	  of	  
her	  main	  points	  is	  that	  Baron’s	  (2016)	  account	  seems	  to	  presuppose	  that	  we	  can	  distinguish	  between	  
idealized	  objects,	  properties,	  systems,	  models,	  etc.,	  one	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  abstract	  mathematical	  (but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Butterfield	  (2011),	  Menon	  and	  Callender	  (2013),	  Norton	  (2012),	  and	  Shech	  (2013).	  See	  Kadanof	  (2000)	  for	  a	  
standard	  introductory	  text	  and	  Ruelle	  (2004)	  for	  rigorous	  results.	  
32	  Where	  by	  a	  non-­‐analytic	  function	  we	  mean,	  roughly,	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  differentiate	  the	  function	  
indefinitely,	  i.e.,	  the	  function	  contains	  ‘kinks’	  or	  ‘discontinuities.’	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not	  idealized)	  objects,	  properties,	  systems,	  models,	  etc.,	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  However,	  our	  ability	  to	  
make	  such	  distinction	  is	  not	  well	  supported	  by	  examples	  from	  mathematical	  physics	  and	  so	  Baron’s	  
account	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  extend	  to	  such	  examples.	  My	  hope	  is	  that	  the	  example	  of	  anyons	  and	  
fractional	  quantum	  statistics	  helps	  to	  elucidate	  this	  point.	  
Nonetheless,	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  we	  can	  make	  the	  type	  of	  distinctions	  needed	  for	  Baron’s	  
account,	  say,	  between	  an	  idealized	  two-­‐dimensional	  system	  and	  the	  abstract	  (but	  non-­‐idealized)	  
topological	  Braid	  group	  structure	  (associated	  with	  the	  fundamental	  group	  of	  the	  configuration	  space	  of	  
identical	  particles	  in	  two-­‐dimensions),	  it	  is	  still	  not	  clear	  to	  me	  that	  Baron’s	  account	  succeeds	  in	  
breaking	  the	  explanatory	  symmetry.	  Instead,	  it	  seems	  that	  on	  the	  standard	  explanatory	  story	  of	  anyons	  
one	  needs	  both	  the	  abstract	  mathematical	  structure	  that	  is	  the	  Braid	  group	  and	  also	  the	  consideration	  
of	  an	  idealized	  two-­‐dimensional	  system.	  Within	  the	  two-­‐dimensional	  setting,	  we	  can	  derive	  the	  Braid	  
group	  structure	  which,	  in	  turn,	  allows	  us	  to	  derive	  fractional	  quantum	  statistics.	  Without	  the	  two-­‐
dimensional	  setting,	  no	  such	  derivation	  is	  possible.	  There	  is	  then	  a	  sense	  for	  which	  both	  the	  idealization	  
and	  abstract	  structure	  are	  “difference	  makers,”	  even	  though	  actual	  systems	  that	  manifest	  fractional	  
quantum	  statistics	  via	  the	  FQHE	  are	  not	  two-­‐dimensional.	  Similar	  statements	  can	  be	  made	  regarding	  
Baron’s	  (2016,	  374)	  comments	  on	  phase	  transitions:	  
	  
[W]hen	  trying	  to	  explain	  why	  a	  phase	  transition	  occurs	  inside	  a	  boiling	  kettle,	  the	  number	  of	  H2O	  
molecules	  makes	  no	  difference.	  Evidence	  for	  this	  comes	  from	  the	  many	  kettles	  that	  have	  been	  
successfully	  boiled	  and	  phase	  transitions	  successfully	  induced.	  These	  kettles	  display	  a	  large	  
variation	  in	  the	  number	  of	  H2O	  molecules,	  whilst	  in	  each	  case	  a	  phase	  transition	  occurs	  anyway,	  
so	  long	  as	  there	  is	  sufficient	  heat	  to	  produce	  boiling.	  
	  
But	  on	  the	  standard	  scientific	  accounts	  of	  phase	  transitions,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  phase	  transitions	  in	  a	  
system	  with	  any	  finite	  number	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  so	  that	  the	  number	  of	  H2O	  molecules	  is	  a	  difference	  
maker	  for	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  phase	  transitions	  according	  to	  our	  best	  theories.	  This	  is	  why	  phenomena	  
such	  as	  phase	  transitions,	  spontaneous	  symmetry	  breaking	  (in	  quantum	  statistical	  mechanics	  and	  
quantum	  field	  theory),	  fractional	  quantum	  statistics,	  etc.,	  are	  so	  puzzling	  and	  interesting:	  the	  standard	  
characterization	  and	  explanation	  of	  such	  phenomena	  are	  at	  odds	  with	  what	  we	  take	  to	  be	  actualized	  in	  
the	  world,	  namely,	  finite	  as	  opposed	  to	  infinite	  systems,	  three-­‐dimensional	  as	  opposed	  to	  two-­‐
dimensional	  systems,	  etc.	  To	  just	  note,	  as	  Baron	  does	  above,	  that	  the	  number	  of	  H2O	  molecules	  makes	  
no	  difference	  to	  actual,	  concrete	  phase	  transitions	  in	  the	  world	  (which,	  in	  fact,	  is	  not	  the	  case	  since	  even	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phenomenologically	  we	  need	  a	  certain	  minimum	  amount	  of	  molecules	  for	  a	  phase	  transition),	  or	  that	  
the	  non-­‐two-­‐dimensionality	  makes	  no	  difference	  to	  actual,	  concrete	  fractional	  quantum	  statistics	  
manifested	  in	  the	  FQHE	  within	  the	  laboratory,	  misses	  the	  entire	  point!	  
Said	  differently,	  if	  by	  “difference	  maker”	  Baron	  (2016)	  means	  something	  that	  can	  make	  a	  causal	  
difference	  to	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  concrete	  physical	  phenomenon,	  then	  no	  abstract	  object	  (mathematical	  
or	  idealized)	  whatsoever	  can	  ever	  satisfy	  the	  role	  of	  difference	  maker.	  However,	  if	  by	  “difference	  maker”	  
we	  mean	  making	  a	  difference	  to	  the	  mathematical	  derivation	  which	  is	  an	  essential	  ingredient	  in	  the	  
explanatory	  story	  told	  by	  our	  best	  sciences	  of	  a	  some	  concrete	  physical	  phenomenon,	  then	  both	  the	  
number	  of	  H2O	  molecules	  and	  the	  dimensionality	  of	  a	  system	  are	  difference	  makers	  for	  phase	  




My	  goal	  in	  this	  essay	  was	  to	  make	  some	  interesting	  connections	  between	  the	  literature	  on	  infinite	  and	  
infinitesimal	  idealizations	  in	  science	  and	  issues	  in	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics	  such	  as	  mathematical	  
indispensability	  and	  explanation.	  In	  particular,	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  standard	  explanatory	  story	  of	  the	  
phenomena	  of	  fractional	  statistics	  constitutes	  a	  genuine	  mathematical	  explanation	  that	  bears	  negatively	  
on	  Leng’s	  proposed	  path	  to	  easy	  road	  nominalism—specifically,	  in	  its	  expounded	  form	  via	  Norton’s	  
distinction	  between	  approximation	  and	  idealization.	  In	  doing	  so	  I	  take	  myself	  to	  have	  partially	  defended	  
Mark	  Colyvan’s	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  no	  easy	  road	  to	  nominalism.	  Having	  said	  that,	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  be	  
only	  critical	  of	  Leng’s	  approach:	  I	  take	  it	  that	  fleshing	  out	  “approximate	  instantiating”	  via	  Norton’s	  
distinction	  is	  a	  positive	  development	  of	  any	  Leng-­‐style	  NSR	  account.	  Future	  work	  in	  this	  direction	  may	  
include	  looking	  to	  other	  examples	  of	  infinite/infinitesimal	  idealization	  in	  science	  and	  assessing	  whether	  
or	  not	  they	  support	  Leng-­‐style	  NSR.	  
More	  generally	  though,	  I	  aim	  to	  draw	  further	  attention	  to	  the	  possible	  explanatory	  symmetry	  
between	  essential	  idealizations	  and	  mathematical	  objects.	  To	  that	  effect,	  consider	  again	  Baker’s	  (e.g.	  
2005;	  2009,	  613)	  Enhanced	  Indispensability	  Argument	  (EIA),	  but	  with	  reference	  to	  mathematical	  objects	  
extracted:	  
	  
(1)	  We	  ought	  rationally	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  any	  entity	  that	  plays	  an	  indispensable	  
explanatory	  role	  in	  our	  best	  scientific	  theories.	  
(2)	  X	  plays	  an	  indispensable	  explanatory	  role	  in	  science.	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(3)	  Hence,	  we	  ought	  rationally	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  X.	  
	  
Concentrating	  on	  examples	  that	  arise	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  essential,	  infinite/infinitesimal	  idealization	  in	  
physics	  (e.g.,	  Batterman	  (2002,	  2005),	  Bokulich	  (2008)),	  it	  seems	  that	  both	  “mathematical	  objects”	  and	  
“idealizations”	  (or	  “idealized	  systems/models”)	  could	  satisfy	  the	  role	  that	  “X”	  plays	  in	  the	  EIA.	  Those	  
who	  take	  this	  point	  to	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  reductio	  against	  the	  EIA	  may	  exult	  if	  they	  hold	  nominalist	  intuitions,	  
or	  try	  to	  break	  the	  symmetry	  (as	  Baron	  (2016)	  does)	  if	  they	  embrace	  Platonist	  intuitions.	  Alternatively,	  if	  
one	  is	  willing	  to	  commit	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  abstract	  objects	  such	  as	  sets,	  numbers,	  fundamental	  groups,	  
structure,	  etc.,	  one	  may	  be	  willing	  also	  embrace	  ontological	  commitment	  to	  some	  idealized	  models	  such	  
as	  infinite	  systems,	  two-­‐dimensional	  systems,	  thermodynamic	  reversible	  processes,	  etc.,	  which	  seem	  to	  
be	  indispensible	  to,	  as	  well	  as	  part	  and	  parcel	  of,	  our	  best	  scientific	  theories.	  My	  suggestion	  then	  is	  that	  
proponents	  of	  the	  easy	  road	  nominalism	  debate,	  and	  the	  debate	  on	  mathematical	  explanation,	  may	  
benefit	  from	  attending	  to	  examples	  of	  essential,	  infinite/infinitesimal	  idealization	  science.	  Equally,	  it	  is	  
would	  be	  interesting	  to	  explore	  whether	  accounts	  of	  scientific	  explanation	  such	  as	  Batterman	  (2002),	  
Batterman	  and	  Rice	  (2014),	  and	  Bokulich	  (2008),	  which	  maintain	  that	  idealization	  and	  fictions	  are	  
indispensible	  for	  explanatory	  purposes,	  ought	  to	  be	  committed	  to	  some	  form	  of	  Platonism	  because	  of	  
the	  EIA.	  I	  leave	  such	  explorations	  for	  future	  work.	  
	  
Appendix	  A:	  The	  Configuration	  Space	  Approach	  to	  Fractional	  Quantum	  Statistics	  
	  
Let	  the	  configuration	  space	  of	  a	  particle	  in	  𝑑-­‐dimensions	  be	  ℝ! 	  (where	  ℝ	  is	  the	  set	  of	  real	  numbers)	  so	  
that	  the	  position	  of	  the	  particles	  is	  given	  by	  an	  element	  of	  the	  space	  𝑥 ∈ ℝ!.	  Consider	  𝑁	  such	  identical	  
particles.	  The	  configuration	  space	  approach	  argues	  that	  the	  appropriate	  configuration	  space	  𝑄	  for	  𝑁	  
identical	  particles	  is	  not	  the	  Cartesian	  product	  of	  the	  single	  particle	  spaces,	  ℝ!" ≡ ℝ!×…×ℝ! 	  (𝑁	  
times),	  as	  one	  would	  expect	  if	  the	  particles	  were	  not	  identical.	  Instead,	  since	  the	  particles	  are	  identical,	  
configurations	  that	  differ	  only	  by	  a	  permutation	  of	  particles	  ought	  to	  correspond	  to	  the	  same	  physical	  
state.	  For	  the	  simplest	  case	  𝑑 = 1  𝑁 = 2,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  two	  configurations	   𝑥!, 𝑥! = (1,2)	  and	  𝑥!, 𝑥! = (2,1)	  actually	  represent	  the	  same	  state,	  and	  so	  we	  must	  divide	  out	  such	  permuted	  
configurations.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  move	  from	  the	  entire	  space	  ℝ!" = ℝ!∗! = ℝ!	  of	  the	  two-­‐
dimensional	  plane	  to	  consider	  only	  half	  the	  plane.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  general	  case,	  this	  corresponds	  to	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considering	  the	  quotient	  (or	  identification)	  space	  that	  one	  attains	  by	  diving	  out	  the	  permutation	  group	  𝑆!:	  𝑄 = ℝ!!!.	  	  
	   Next,	  we’ll	  want	  to	  excise	  the	  set	  ∆	  of	  diagonal	  points	  in	  ℝ!",	  which	  represent	  all	  points	  where	  
the	  particles	  coincide.	  For	  the	  𝑑 = 1  𝑁 = 2	  case,	  this	  means	  that	  we	  must	  excise	  points	  of	  the	  sort:	  𝑥!, 𝑥! = (𝑥, 𝑥),	  where	  𝑥! = 𝑥!.	  If	  we	  do	  not	  excise	  coincidence	  points	  (known	  as	  singular	  points)	  the	  
resulting	  configuration	  space	  will	  not	  have	  a	  structure	  rich	  enough	  to	  represent	  fermions	  (or	  anyons).	  
	   We	  are	  left	  with	  a	  configuration	  space	  for	  𝑁	  identical	  particle	  in	  𝑑	  dimensions,	  in	  which	  we	  have	  
divided	  out	  the	  action	  of	  the	  permutation	  group	  and	  excluded	  diagonal	  points:	  ℝ!!∆!! 	  .	  The	  exclusion	  of	  
the	  diagonal	  point	  implies	  that	  the	  space	  in	  not	  simply	  connected	  and	  I	  denote	  this	  new	  configuration	  
space	  with  𝑄.	  We	  must	  now	  undertake	  QM	  on	  a	  multiply	  connected	  space.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so	  I	  will	  follow	  
Morandi	  (1992,	  114-­‐144)	  closely.	  
	   Ordinary	  QM	  (in	  the	  Schrodinger	  picture)	  on	  simply	  connected	  regions	  represents	  the	  states	  of	  
physical	  systems	  by	  complex	  wave	  functions	  Ψ	  which	  are	  elements	  of	  a	  Hilbert	  space	  ℋ	  of	  square-­‐
integrable	  functions	  on	  the	  configuration	  space	  𝑄	  over	  the	  field	  of	  complex	  numbers	  ℂ:	  Ψ ∈ ℋ =𝐿ℂ!(𝑄),	  where	  ℋ! = 𝐿ℂ! 𝑄 ×…×𝐿ℂ! 𝑄 ≅ 𝐿ℂ! 𝑄! 	  for	  𝑁	  identical	  particles.	  In	  order	  to	  extend	  ordinary	  
QM	  to	  multiply	  connected	  regions	  we	  need	  to	  appeal	  the	  topological	  notion	  of	  a	  universal	  covering	  
space	  𝑄	  of	  𝑄	  .	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  for	  any	  topological	  space,	  including	  ones	  that	  are	  not	  simply	  connected	  
such	  as	  𝑄,	  we	  can	  construct	  a	  universal	  covering	  space  𝑄	  that	  is	  simply	  connected	  (so	  that	  ordinary	  QM	  
applies)	  with	  a	  covering	  projection	  map:	  𝜋:𝑄 → 𝑄	  (where	  𝑞 ∈ 𝑄	  and	  𝑞 ∈ 𝑄).	   	  
	   Since	  all	  the	  physical	  information	  in	  QM	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  squared	  modulus	  of	  the	  wave	  
function	  (i.e.	  the	  probability	  density)	   Ψ(𝑞) !,	  we	  will	  want	  this	  quantity	  to	  be	  projectable	  down	  to	  𝑄	  for	  
any	  𝑞 ∈ 𝑄	  in	  the	  sense	  that	   Ψ(𝑞) !	  will	  depend	  only	  on	  a	  point	  𝑞 = 𝜋(𝑞)	  in	  the	  multiply	  connected	  
configuration	  space	  𝑄.	  If	  this	  condition	  is	  satisfied	  we	  say	  that	  we	  have	  a	  projectable	  quantum	  
mechanics,	  and	  we	  will	  have	  succeeded	  in	  extending	  ordinary	  QM	  to	  a	  multiply	  connected	  region.	  To	  
that	  effect,	  consider	  an	  arbitrary	  point	  𝑞 ∈ 𝑄,	  let	  𝐶	  be	  a	  closed	  curve	  beginning	  and	  ending	  at	  𝑞,	  and	  let	  
[𝐶]	  be	  the	  corresponding	  (first)	  homotopy	  class	  of	  curves	  based	  at	  𝑞	  so	  that	  [𝐶]∈ 𝜋!(𝑄, 𝑞).33	  Further,	  let	  𝑞 = 𝜋!!(𝑞)	  be	  any	  point	  in	  the	  fiber	  over	  𝑞.	  The	  homotopy	  lifting	  theorem	  says	  that	  all	  curves	  𝐶	  in	  [𝐶]	  
are	  lifted	  to	  a	  curve	  𝐶	  in	  Q	  beginning	  at	  𝑞	  and	  ending	  at	  some	  point	  𝑞’	  that	  is	  also	  in	  the	  fiber	  over	  𝑞	  (so	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  First,	  remember	  that	  𝜋! ≠ 𝜋:	  𝜋!	  represent	  the	  fundemantal	  group	  (the	  first	  homotopy	  group)	  and	  𝜋	  the	  
covering	  projection.	  Second,	  roughly,	  recall	  that	  any	  two	  closed	  curves	  (loops)	  that	  can	  be	  continuously	  deformed	  
into	  one	  another	  will	  be	  part	  of	  the	  same	  homotopy	  class.	  Homotopy	  is	  an	  equivalence	  relation	  among	  loops.	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that	  𝜋 𝑞! = 𝑞	  and	    𝑞’ ∈ 𝑄).34	  Denote	  this	  result	  by	  𝑞’ = [𝐶  ] ∙ 𝑞  and	  recall	  that  𝛾	  represents	  a	  phase	  
factor	  (although,	  as	  of	  now,	  we	  have	  placed	  no	  constraints	  on	  the	  form	  of	  𝛾)	  .	  We	  then	  have	  the	  
following	  two	  central	  theorems	  (Morandi	  1992,	  119-­‐120):	  
	  
Theorem	  1.	  Projectable	  Quantum	  Mechanics	  are	  obtained	  if	  and	  only	  if	  the	  wave	  functions	  on	  
the	  universal	  covering	  space	  obey	  the	  boundary	  conditions:	  
	   Ψ 𝐶   ∙ 𝑞 =   𝛾([𝐶])Ψ(q)	  for	  all	  𝑞 ∈ 𝑄	  
Where	     𝛾([𝐶]) = 1	  for	  all	  [𝐶] ∈   𝜋!(𝑄)	  
	  
This	  means	  that	  wave	  functions	  on	  the	  universal	  covering	  space	  at	  different	  points	  (e.g.	  𝑞	  and	  𝑞’),	  but	  on	  
the	  same	  fiber	  above	  some	  point	  in	  the	  multiply	  connected	  configuration	  space	  (e.g.	  𝑞),	  can	  differ	  at	  
most	  by	  a	  phase	  factor	  of	  modulus	  1.	  Moreover,	  since	  the	  universal	  covering	  space	  is	  simply	  connected,	  
the	  wave	  functions	  must	  be	  single	  valued.	  We	  then	  get:	  
	  
Theorem	  2.	  The	  map	  𝛾:	  𝜋! 𝑄 → 𝑈(1)	  by	   𝐶 →   𝛾([𝐶])	  is	  a	  one-­‐dimensional	  unitary	  
representation	  of	  𝜋! 𝑄 .	  
	  
	   Accordingly,	  we	  get	  our	  main	  result:	  In	  order	  to	  ascertain	  what	  type	  of	  phase	  factor	  is	  gained	  by	  
a	  wave	  function	  when	  it	  is	  permuted―with	  the	  corresponding	  available	  quantum	  statistics―we	  must	  
enquire	  into	  the	  one-­‐dimensional	  unitary	  representation	  of	  the	  fundamental	  group	  of	  the	  configuration	  
space	  of	  the	  system.	  Recall	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  𝑁	  identical	  particles	  in	  𝑑	  dimensions	  we	  have:	  
	   𝑄 = ℝ! − ∆𝑆! 	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  shown	  by	  Artin	  (1947),	  Fadell	  and	  Neuwrith	  (1962),	  and	  Fox	  and	  Neuwrith	  (1962)	  that	  the	  
fundamental	  group	  for	  the	  two-­‐	  and	  three-­‐dimensional	  cases	  are	  given	  by:	  
	   𝜋!     𝑄 = 𝐵!  for  𝑑 = 2	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  𝐶	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  closed	  curve.	  If	  the	  bundle	  is	  not	  curved	  than	  𝐶	  is	  closed	  but	  if	  the	  bundle	  is	  curved	  than	  𝐶  is	  not	  closed.	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𝜋!     𝑄 = 𝑆!  for  𝑑 = 3	  
	  
Where	  𝑆!	  is	  the	  permutation	  group	  and	  𝐵!	  is	  the	  Braid	  group.	  	  Moreover,	  as	  stated	  previously,	  the	  one-­‐
dimensional	  representation	  of	  𝑆!	  is	  𝛾 = ±1,	  +1	  for	  bosons	  and	  −1	  for	  fermions,	  while	  the	  one-­‐
dimensional	  representation	  of	  𝐵!	  is	  	  𝛾 ! = 𝑒!"where	  0 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 2𝜋	  so	  that	  the	  exchange	  phase	  can	  take	  
on	  a	  continuous	  range	  of	  factors	  allowing	  for	  bosons,	  fermions	  and	  anyons.	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